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Climate, Energy, Justice: 
The Policy Path to a Just Transition for an 
Energy-Hungry America 
Executive Summary 
The United States has 4 percent of the world’s population yet produces and 
consumes more than 20 percent of its energy. Correspondingly, the United 
States emits more than 20 percent of global greenhouse gases, largely from 
its fossil fuel economy. The ravages of climate change are intensifying as we 
experience increasingly potent and more frequent storms and as western 
states continue to burn. Significantly, the economic, environmental, and 
health burdens of the nation's current energy system and the consequences 
of climate change fall disproportionately on low-income communities and 
communities of color. 
The United States should and could be a key player in the global transition 
from a dirty energy economy to a clean energy future. Unfortunately, 
although states, local governments, and some private actors are playing 
important roles, federal leadership, both domestically and internationally, is 
sorely lacking. With the coming election and the prospect of a more 
sympathetic administration and Congress, the time is ripe for principled and 
pragmatic solutions to the climate crisis. With careful crafting, such solutions 
can grow the U.S. economy and benefit marginalized communities. 
This paper, written by 19 energy and environmental law professors, all 
Member Scholars of the Center for Progressive Reform, describes the need 
for a transition to clean energy, and offers holistic policy approaches 
designed not simply to reduce greenhouse gases in a vacuum, but to realize 
a vision for an inclusive and more just clean economy. 
Drawing on the unique expertise of its authors, the paper presents a series 
of policy recommendations, all of which are based on three core ideas. The 
first is that good policy requires coordination among three essential 
variables – energy, the environment, and the economy. There is no 
fundamental reason why the United States cannot enjoy a clean energy 
portfolio, a healthy environment, and a robust and fair economy. The second 
core idea, a corollary of the first, is that the transition must be just. A good 
transition leaves no one behind – not workers and communities whose 
livelihoods depended on the fossil fuel sector, not low-income communities, 
and not communities that have disproportionately experienced negative 
energy impacts. The third is that, notwithstanding significant public and 
private climate initiatives around the country, the nation desperately needs 
federal vision, policies, and resources. Policies predicated on these principles 
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offer the best hope for our individual and collective future, both here in the 
United States and around the world. 
Recommendations 
Applying their expertise in energy law, environmental law, environmental 
justice, administrative law, and Native American law, CPR's co-authors 
explore the many steps that Congress and the next president should take 
toward a just, economically sound, and environmentally protective national 
climate policy, offering dozens of specific recommendations for achieving a 
just transition to clean energy. 
The co-authors first offer a series of recommendations addressing specific 
sectors critical to a clean transition, including electricity, transportation, and 
public lands. They then provide cross-cutting recommendations relevant 
throughout the federal government, including climate justice, governance 
mechanisms, and, taking a wider view, structural insights that should inform 
the relationships among federal agencies, the states, and the courts. 
Sector-Specific Recommendations 
• Electricity Policy: Congress should establish a federal clean energy 
standard, improve the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 
oversight of federal energy markets, and expand federal authority over 
electric transmission line siting and the exercise of eminent domain to 
enable better access to renewable resources. 
• Transportation Policy: Congress and a new administration should 
accelerate electrification of the vehicle fleet by revoking the Trump 
administration’s efforts to lower greenhouse gas standards and by 
setting higher efficiency and electric car requirements. Congress should 
also require new measures to ensure adequate charging and clean 
electricity infrastructure, and should facilitate measures to reduce 
driving, all while prioritizing clean transportation investments in frontline 
and low-income communities. 
• Public Lands Policy: To protect public lands from increased risks posed 
by climate change, Congress and a new administration should ensure 
that federal agencies avoid or, if necessary, mitigate harms to our public 
lands, that they exercise their control to phase out development of 
nonrenewable energy resources, and that they marshal federal resources 
to enhance climate resiliency, preserve the biodiversity of public lands, 
and revise national forest planning rules to ensure forest sustainability. 
Cross-cutting Recommendations 
• Climate Justice: Congress should enact just transitions legislation that 
provides fossil-fuel reliant communities with new and improved 
economic opportunities. Congress and the administration should also 
provide access to energy efficiency and renewable resources--as well as 
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support for higher energy costs--to low-income communities; prioritize 
climate policies that provide the most pollution-reduction co-benefits; 
and provide federal parameters and support to the low-income and 
frontline communities least able to cope with impending climate harms. 
• Governance Mechanisms: Congress and a new administration should 
employ a variety of tools to achieve effective governance, including: 
federally funded research and development needed to lay the 
groundwork for private investment; a more realistic assessment of the 
cost of inaction (known as the “social cost of carbon”) to better inform a 
wide variety of regulatory actions; careful consideration of carbon pricing 
options; a vision and associated strategies for achieving a just transition 
in addition to carbon pricing; and well-funded and effective enforcement 
of all federal climate policies. 
• Structural Considerations: Going beyond specific policies, Congress 
should enhance effective governance by optimizing the relationships 
among different agencies and levels of government. CPR Member 
Scholars offer a range of insights on the factors that should guide the 
allocation of authority between the federal government and the states 
and among agencies with related missions, recommending a careful 
balance between federal and state authority and a continued role for the 
courts. 
Energy, the environment, and the economy are all parts of an interrelated 
whole – they are not separate and distinct areas of concern. Most 
importantly, the transition to a better and cleaner future must be done justly 
and democratically. We can no longer afford to indulge the erroneous 
assumption that our economy must accommodate capital-intensive, large-
scale, fossil fuel energy production, distribution, and consumption without 
accounting for the attendant social costs. Instead, we can enjoy clean 
energy; we can enjoy decentralized power; we can enjoy clean air, water, 
and land; and we can grow our economy and protect our citizens, even the 
most vulnerable. These are not utopian aspirations; these are the demands 
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Climate, Energy, Justice: 
The Policy Path to a Just Transition for an 
Energy-Hungry America 
Introduction 
Three principles undergird the analysis and recommendations offered in this 
paper: 
Principle 1: Integrating Energy, the Environment, and the Economy 
Energy, the environment, and the economy are intrinsic parts of a whole. 
Virtually all energy comes from natural resources such as coal, oil, natural 
gas, or such renewable resources as wind, hydroelectric, and solar. In order 
to generate usable energy, these natural resources must be discovered, 
extracted or harnessed, processed, distributed, and in the case of non-
renewable sources, consumed. Environmental consequences follow each 
stage of that process. These resources are marshalled by companies and the 
people they employ, who live in communities that are affected by the 
employment opportunities and the environmental harms they create. As 
some resources wax and others wane, people’s fortunes wax and wane with 
them. 
There are always trade-offs between energy, the environment, and the 
economy. Policies narrowly focused on only one factor – on energy but not 
its environmental or economic effects; or on the environment, without 
regard to our need for energy and the economic implications of 
environmental protection; or on the economy, without regard to our need 
for clean energy and a clean environment – could cause unnecessary harm. 
Fossil fuels create energy and current jobs but are destroying our 
environment. Wind power reduces climate harms and creates new 
employment opportunities but could cause bird deaths. Energy efficiency 
reduces the need for energy without harming the environment.  With a 
thoughtful weighing of the tradeoffs across policy silos, we can achieve a 
just transition that maximizes benefits and reduces potential harms. 
Principle 2: The Clean Energy Transition and Social Justice 
Merging energy, the environment, and the economy is not only a matter of 
economic policy. It is also a matter of social justice. 
Throughout the 20th century, the country’s energy and environmental 
policies were uncoordinated, producing an energy sector that was large-
scale and capital-intensive, centralized and national in scope, and 
dominated by pollution-heavy fossil fuels and nuclear power. Critics like 
 
 
Climate, Energy, Justice         5 
Amory Lovins warned that this paradigm was highly inefficient and 
threatened nuclear proliferation.  
Environmental justice activists – led by Professor Robert Bullard – alerted the 
country to the social injustice of it all, highlighting the ways that 
communities of color and low-income communities have borne the 
disproportionate burden of our fossil fuel economy. They are more likely to 
live close to power plants, to the refineries that generate oil and gas, to the 
petrochemical facilities that produce oil-based chemicals used throughout 
our economy, and to the ports, highways, and railways that generate toxic 
vehicular pollution.  
Our energy and environmental policies, in other words, have had 
demonstrable racial and economic consequences. A clean energy transition 
can not only reduce the risks of climate change – which themselves fall 
disproportionately on the most vulnerable – but should also prioritize the 
pollution burdens that have persistently affected frontline communities. 
Policymakers leading the transition should ensure that new energy 
development avoids perpetuating this trend. 
A socially just transition would not only alleviate the disproportionate 
pollution burdens highlighted by the environmental justice movement; it 
would also promote economic justice. As an example, rooftop solar is a 
critical part of the energy transition, but it must be done right. Policies 
should prioritize installation on buildings in low-income areas – the 
locations where residents will benefit the most from lower electricity bills. 
Another key aspect of the international just transition movement is 
facilitating a smooth transition for the fossil fuel workers who lose their jobs 
in the fossil fuel sector. The free market is unlikely to ensure that the 
individuals, communities, regions, states, and Native Americans who have 
relied on fossil fuel extraction and processing will seamlessly transition to 
the new opportunities created by a clean economy. Inclusive planning and 
transition resources will be necessary to ensure that these workers and their 
communities have a place in a better future. 
Social justice and democracy are linked. The energy democracy movement 
favors the decentralization of energy production and distribution. In 
contrast to large central power stations where decisions are made at the top, 
a decentralized energy service, such as a microgrid, can be locally owned. 
Local control creates opportunities for more democratic participation and 
more input from consumers than is possible under our centralized fossil-
fuel-based electricity model. 
In short, a more decentralized and democratic energy system, one that is 
more responsive to the needs of the communities it serves, can find 
common ground with the environmental justice movement’s advocacy for 
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environmental and economic justice. Lovins’ advocacy for decentralized 
energy and Bullard’s advocacy for social justice laid the foundation for the 
emerging climate justice, just transition, and energy democracy movements. 
All of these initiatives are intended to protect the vulnerable from 
environmental and economic harms while providing access to affordable 
and democratically controlled energy. 
Principle 3: Federal Leadership Is Necessary for an Effective 
Transition 
Many cities, states, utilities, and private companies are valiantly pursuing 
climate action notwithstanding the lack of federal leadership and 
insufficient resources. The majority of U.S. states have established renewable 
portfolio standards. Many have also set ambitious greenhouse gas reduction 
targets, and even, in some cases, integrated social justice strategies. Cities 
have likewise set significant clean energy and carbon reduction goals and 
adopted efficiency standards. Indeed, several cities already obtain or 
generate 100 percent of the electricity consumed within their jurisdiction 
from green power. Many utilities around the United States have shuttered 
coal-fired power plants and replaced them with cleaner sources. And some 
large consumers of electricity – companies like Walmart and Amazon – have 
adopted clean energy goals and taken meaningful action toward 
implementing those goals. 
Important as these efforts are, they are not comprehensive, and they are not 
holistic. Many states and cities are taking action – but many are not. Some 
states are instituting ambitious electric car policies, but these efforts require 
a national clean electricity grid and adequate charging infrastructure for the 
climate benefits to fully materialize. New employment opportunities are 
emerging, but not necessarily in the places where opportunities are 
disappearing. 
Federal leadership – leadership that respects and builds on existing 
initiatives – is necessary to achieve a coherent and just transition. Recent 
initiatives have started to shape a path forward. The Green New Deal (GND) 
championed by Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in the House and by Sen. 
Edward Markey in the Senate encapsulates all the above principles. The GND 
integrates environmental goals with social and economic reforms designed 
to simultaneously stem climate change and address the country’s depressed 
economy, sustain a strong citizenry, and provide meaningful protections for 
workers and other disadvantaged populations. 
Similarly, in June 2020, the House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis put 
forth an extensive list of policy proposals that integrate energy, 
environmental, and economic concerns, and that repeatedly emphasize the 
importance of addressing the needs of the most vulnerable. 
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Accomplishing the ambitious challenge of a clean energy transition that 
leaves no one behind requires insightful, creative, carefully crafted policies. 
In the pages that follow, CPR's co-authors offer recommendations 
addressing specific sectors critical to a clean transition, including electricity, 
transportation, and public lands, then go on to offer cross-cutting 
recommendations relevant throughout the federal government, addressing 
climate justice, governance mechanisms, and the relationships among 
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Federal Electricity Policy and the Climate Crisis 
By Alexandra B. Klass, Uma Outka, Hannah J. Wiseman 
Summary 
The evolving nature of the U.S. energy market, coupled with the imperative 
to reduce carbon emissions as a check on climate change, has left the 
federal government with out-of-date and inadequate energy policies. Rather 
than encouraging the transition to renewable energy sources, current 
policies lean toward the status quo, propping up a system of electricity 
generation that is poisoning the planet and wasting money.  
In reforming federal policies to modernize the energy sector, it is vital that 
lawmakers are responsive to issues of fairness and 
equity. For example, household energy burdens 
and the environmental harms of electric 
power generation disproportionately 
impact low-income people and 
communities of color. Energy law reform 
should seek to alleviate these burdens and 
channel benefits from the clean energy 
transition to areas that have been 
disadvantaged. We set forth the following 
recommendations discussed in more detail below: 
Recommendation #1: Congress should demonstrate a national 
commitment to climate change mitigation and protecting communities 
from power plant pollution by enacting a federal clean energy standard.  
Recommendation #2: To remove the substantial obstacles to state-
supported clean energy transition posed by new regional wholesale 
electricity market rules, particularly in the PJM Regional Transmission 
Organization, Congress should direct the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) to categorically exempt new renewable resources and 
existing nuclear power plants from these rules.  
Recommendation #3: Congress should expand federal authority over the 
approval of new interstate electric transmission lines to support greater 
integration of renewable energy into the U.S. electric grid. Congress could 
combine this expansion of federal authority over transmission lines with 
greater scrutiny of FERC’s practices with regard to the siting and eminent 
domain for interstate natural gas pipelines and other fossil fuel 
infrastructure within FERC’s existing jurisdiction. 
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Background 
As a result of technological developments, government research and 
financial support, and federal and state clean energy policies, the U.S. 
electricity sector has changed significantly over the past decade. The use of 
coal to generate electricity nationwide has dropped precipitously as electric 
utilities move to cleaner and less expensive energy supplies such as natural 
gas, wind, and solar energy. Moreover, many of the new energy resources 
are not traditional, “utility-scale” power plants. Instead, “distributed” 
localized energy resources, such as residential and commercial rooftop solar, 
have exploded across the country in both rural and urban areas alongside 
new large-scale wind and solar plants built by electric utilities and their 
corporate partners. Greater energy efficiency resources, “demand 
response,”1 and large-scale battery technologies have also altered the 
traditional electric grid, creating both new opportunities and new 
challenges for federal electricity markets, grid operators, and state and 
federal energy regulators.  
Despite these rapid changes, significant economic, technical, and policy 
barriers remain, impeding the progress toward a clean energy transition that 
benefits all communities. Entrenched fossil fuel interests 
and outdated laws that favor the fossil fuel status quo 
make it difficult to bring about real change. For all the 
talk of the clean energy transition underway, the fact 
remains that as of 2020, 62 percent of the electricity 
sector and 95 percent of the transportation sector 
remain powered by fossil fuels.2 Innovative federal 
clean energy policies are critical to decarbonizing the 
energy sector and avoiding catastrophic climate 
change.  
This paper highlights three actions Congress can take 
to put in place policies that can support a clean 
energy transition in the electricity sector: (1) a federal 
clean energy standard; (2) legislation explicitly supporting 
state clean energy policies in the administration of regional electricity 
markets; and (3) greater federal authority to pave the way for new, interstate 
electric transmission lines needed to support the integration of large-scale 
renewable energy resources into the electric grid. Each of these issues is 
addressed in more detail below and summarized here. In proposing these 
federal policies, we urge lawmakers to be responsive to issues of fairness 
and equity. For example, household energy burdens and the environmental 
harms of electric power generation disproportionately impact low-income 
people and communities of color. Energy law reform should seek to alleviate 
these burdens and channel benefits from the clean energy transition to 
areas that have been disadvantaged.   
Entrenched fossil fuel interests 
and outdated laws that favor 
the fossil fuel status quo make it 
difficult to bring about real 
change. For all the talk of the 
clean energy transition 
underway, the fact remains that 
as of 2020, 62 percent of the 
electricity sector and 95 percent 
of the transportation sector 
remain powered by fossil fuels.  
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Without a federal clean energy standard, states have taken the first step: 
enacting such aggressive clean energy policies as renewable portfolio 
standards, transforming, in many states, the way electric utilities do business 
by mandating that an increasing percentage of the electricity they sell to 
customers comes from carbon-free energy sources by a set date. Hawaii was 
the first state to set a 100 percent clean energy goal in 2015, and other states 
have since followed suit.3 But these policies differ widely by state and have 
not been enacted in some parts of the country at all, particularly in the 
southeastern United States. This raises the question of whether a 
congressionally enacted federal clean energy standard would support a 
more rapid clean energy transition and benefit those states that have not 
already developed an ample supply of carbon-free energy within their 
borders. 
As for regional electricity markets, electric utilities and other power 
providers in large swaths of the United States participate in federally 
regulated, interstate electricity markets within Regional Transmission 
Organizations (RTOs). FERC provides oversight of these markets and their 
rules. As a greater number of clean energy resources, such as wind, solar, 
and storage, increase their participation in these markets, questions arise 
over how to address state financial support for them within the RTO market 
structure. As controversy has grown over FERC orders applying to one of 
these markets—PJM in the northeastern United States—there is an 
opportunity for Congress to act. As set forth below, Congress should give 
additional policy guidance to FERC through legislation to ensure that 
outdated market rules do not stymie a clean energy transition or impose 
additional costs on utilities, consumers, and communities that wish to take 
advantage of these low-cost, clean energy resources. 
With regard to the physical electric grid, interstate electric transmission lines 
are critical to integrating utility-scale wind and solar energy into the grid and 
to transporting onshore wind and solar energy from where it can be 
generated to population centers that are often several states away. State 
laws currently make it difficult for transmission line operators to obtain 
siting permits for interstate and intrastate electric transmission lines. In 
addition, state laws sometimes prevent those entities from exercising 
eminent domain authority for such lines. Sometimes, this is because the 
actor seeking to build the line is a “merchant” transmission line company 
rather than a public utility, and sometimes, this is because the transmission 
of electric energy across a state (as opposed to from or to a state) is not 
considered a “public need” or a “public use” under state law. In other parts of 
the energy sector, interstate natural gas pipelines, for example, Congress has 
acted to overcome roadblocks and created federal authority over portions of 
this infrastructure. Congress can do the same with regard to transmission 
lines in ways set forth below. 
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Proposed Policy: A Federal Clean Energy Standard 
By Uma Outka 
Background and Context 
The current patchwork of state renewable energy portfolio standards and 
related state clean energy laws has played a critical role in advancing clean 
energy resources over the last 10 to 15 years, particularly wind and solar 
energy. In 2020, the use of renewable energy finally exceeded coal use on 
the electric grid at a nationwide level.4 Yet there can be no mistaking that 
this is the critical decade for accelerating the clean energy transition. 
According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the world 
needs to stabilize climate change by 2030 or face dire global consequences. 
In the forward to its 2019 Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5° C, the 
panel is clear: “Without increased and urgent mitigation ambition in the 
coming years, leading to a sharp decline in greenhouse gas emissions by 
2030, global warming will surpass 1.5°C in the following decades, leading to 
irreversible loss of the most fragile ecosystems, and crisis after crisis for the 
most vulnerable people and societies.”5 
The United States remains a top global emitter of greenhouse gases (GHGs) 
and far exceeds the per capita electricity consumption of most other 
developed nations.6 Although the trajectory for 
renewables in the United States is promising, more 
rapid change is needed than inconsistent state 
policies alone will yield. The current regulatory 
landscape is a patchwork of vastly different 
commitments to clean energy across the states, 
ranging from 50 to 100 percent clean energy goals in a 
growing number of states often adjacent to states with 
no formal clean energy goal at all. In short, the clean energy transition 
suffers from the absence of federal guidance. The transition is underway, but 
too slowly. Federal stewardship is needed to accelerate the shift the world 
needs the United States to achieve, in good faith alongside every other 
nation under international commitments to ambitiously reduce GHGs.7  
Now, at the start of a new and critical decade, the time is right for Congress 
advance a federal clean energy standard that will rapidly shift the U.S. 
energy sector away from fossil fuels.  
A federal clean energy standard is not a new policy concept. There have 
been dozens of proposals in Congress for just such a measure, but none to 
date have garnered sufficient support to become federal law.8 More now 
than ever before, an electricity sector based on clean energy resources is 
within reach. Five years ago, for example, the Deep Decarbonization 
The United States remains a top 
global emitter of greenhouse 
gases (GHGs) and far exceeds the 
per capita electricity consumption 
of most other developed nations. 
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Pathways Project outlined methods for bringing GHG emissions to 80 
percent below 1990 levels by 2050 through policy reforms that would 
electrify many end uses of energy while shifting away from fossil fuel 
generation of electric power.9 This year, informed by the most recent IPCC 
warnings, a University of California Berkeley report outlines a pathway to “90 
percent zero carbon electricity” by 2035, using among other things, a federal 
clean energy standard on an accelerated timetable.10  
Importantly, a well-designed federal clean energy standard can be adopted 
without compromising the progress states have made or even hinder their 
momentum. Indeed, a federal standard should complement the most 
ambitious states’ work by setting a nationwide trajectory that brings the rest 
of the states forward. Although not every state has the same renewable 
resource potential as the next, regional electricity markets covering roughly 
60 percent of the country have helped to compensate for these 
differences.11 A federal standard will need complementary policies to help it 
accelerate clean energy development within a narrow time horizon—for 
example, support for communities that have depended on fossil fuel 
industries, and the market oversight and transmission and siting reforms 
discussed below. Yet it is a centerpiece policy approach that can build on 
and support the most effective state models, enhanced by complementary 
reforms.  
It is important to recognize that a federal clean energy standard would do 
more than accelerate GHG emissions reductions needed for climate 
stabilization. Scaling up clean energy resources will alleviate longstanding 
local and regional air pollution and water pollution caused by coal-fired and 
natural gas power plants. This pollution has disproportionately harmed low-
income people, especially in communities of color. As the power generated 
by these facilities is supplanted with clean energy resources, the quality of 
life and public health outcomes will improve for affected communities 
across the United States. This is why organizations like the NAACP 
Environmental and Climate Justice Program have focused on shutting down 
coal plants and other toxic facilities at the local level while working to 
advance renewable energy and energy efficiency policies at the state level.12  
Recommendations 
Congress should demonstrate a national commitment to climate change 
mitigation and protecting communities from power plant pollution by 
enacting a federal clean energy standard.  
Although there are a range of instrument designs that could be explored, we 
recommend the following guiding principles: 
• The standard should require the rapid expansion of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, and energy storage resources across the electric grid 
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for deep reductions in GHG emissions from the electricity sector. The 
standard should provide a timeline for transition that corresponds to 
current climate science.  
• The standard should mandate or otherwise create strong incentives for 
states to prioritize low income communities and communities of color 
for energy efficiency and clean energy investment, through robust 
community engagement. 
• The standard should not limit ambitious states that are innovating or 
cutting GHG emissions from the electricity sector at a faster pace than 
the standard requires.  
Proposed Policy: Congressional Guidance to FERC in 
Overseeing Federal Energy Markets  
By Hannah J. Wiseman13 
Background and Context 
Renewable energy infrastructure must be connected to transmission lines—
often a large network of lines—in order to be economically feasible. 
Renewable generation is often located in very rural regions, and renewable 
generators need to be able to send their product long distances to populous 
areas called “load centers.” One historical challenge faced by renewable 
generators has been the difficulty of transacting with multiple transmission 
line operators to get their product – electricity – to consumers. Even when 
physical transmission lines were available, renewable generators had to 
contract with each transmission line operator for a rate for use of the line, 
often meaning that a generator sending electricity from a wind farm to 
distant customers had to pay numerous “pancaked” rates. The formation of 
regional transmission organizations (RTOs) has been critical to easing the 
sale of renewable generation because RTOs take over operational control of 
the wires from individual utilities, thus avoiding pancaked rates. RTOs also 
create competitive, wholesale markets for electricity that give renewable 
generators outlets for their electricity beyond the traditional, long-term 
“power purchase agreement” in which a customer commits to a purchase of 
electricity at a set rate or fixed, gradually increasing rate, often for a period of 
twenty years.  
RTOs, although essential to enabling the recent expansion of renewable 
generation, have also stymied the addition of renewable capacity in some 
cases. This is most apparent in the Mid-Atlantic area, where FERC has 
ordered the RTO in this region, PJM, to require that most generators bidding 
into the competitive PJM market offer a minimum price. This “minimum 
offer price rule,” or MOPR, applies to capacity markets, which are markets in 
which generators commit to supply electricity in the future. In other words, 
 
 
Climate, Energy, Justice         14 
generators commit to build new infrastructure or otherwise have 
infrastructure available to supply electricity. Capacity markets are key to 
spurring the construction of new generation infrastructure, because without 
an assurance that their generation will be used and purchased, generators 
are often hesitant to build.  
FERC’s MOPR order issued to PJM in 2019 requires the RTO to set a minimum 
“floor” price in its capacity market.14 Any generator that receives state 
subsidies, and that is therefore able to bid into the market at a price below 
this floor, has to receive case-by-case approval from PJM to bid in at this 
lower rate. The only exempted renewable resources are those that are 
already operating to meet states’ existing renewable portfolio standards or 
had cleared a capacity auction or completed an agreement to interconnect 
with PJM wires prior to the date of the order.15 The many new renewable 
resources that must be built to comply with states’ more 
aggressive clean energy measures are subject to the 
rule. Additionally, existing resources that receive state 
subsidies, such as zero-carbon nuclear power plants, are 
subject to the rule and may not be able to continue 
operating if subject to the MOPR.16 Aside from the 
resource-specific exemptions, the only other way for 
renewable and nuclear generation to avoid the rule is to 
apply for a “Unit-Specific Exemption,” justifying a price 
below the floor by showing specific data about the 
generation unit’s costs.17 
FERC’s MOPR order has the result of making it less likely 
that state-subsidized renewable and nuclear resources will 
“clear” the capacity auction—in other words, decreasing the chance that 
these generation products will be selected and paid for in the capacity 
auction. A similar MOPR in another RTO, ISO New England, was also 
approved by FERC.18  
FERC’s justification for the MOPR is that allowing state-subsidized generators 
to bid into competitive markets at lower rates undercuts competition and 
creates unjust and unreasonable rates. But as others have noted, fossil fuel 
generators receive hidden subsidies because, due to the lack of a federal 
carbon tax or other federal regulation of carbon emissions, they externalize 
their environmental damage, leaving everyone else on the planet to pay the 
cost in the form of illness and death and various forms of environmental 
degradation.19 Further, the MOPR interferes substantially with states’ ability 
under the Federal Power Act to set generation policy, and it could increase 
prices by entrenching old energy infrastructure that is not subject to the 
MOPR. One FERC Commissioner’s strong dissent from the FERC MOPR order 
for PJM sums up the issues nicely: “From the beginning, this [FERC] 
proceeding has been about two things: Dramatically increasing the price of 
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capacity in PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM) and slowing the region’s 
transition to a clean energy future.”20  
Estimates of the impacts of the PJM MOPR vary substantially, but many are 
bleak. First, states and individual utilities that wish to continue subsidizing 
renewables and avoid the MOPR problem have the option of leaving the 
RTO’s capacity market and instead adopting a strategy called a “Fixed 
Resource Requirement.”21 The independent market monitor for PJM 
estimates that this could increase costs--in just one capacity auction--by 
several million dollars.22 For states that opt to have utilities within the state 
remain within the PJM capacity market, analysts project that some 
renewable resources, such as offshore wind, would not clear the markets at 
all, meaning that offshore wind would still be built but would not be 
recognized as a resource to supply electricity needs in the future. Some 
analysts believe that the capacity markets--blind to the offshore wind 
resource as a result of its failure to clear capacity auctions--would instead fill 
the additional electricity need with other resources, such as fossil fuel-fired 
power. This would produce more electricity generation than is needed, and 
the generation would be dirtier.23  
Numerous parties have petitioned the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to 
review the FERC MOPR order, and PJM has completed two compliance 
filings with FERC in an effort to follow FERC’s MOPR order but avoid some of 
the major, costly consequences of the order.24 The March 2020 compliance 
filing, which is most relevant to zero-carbon resources, lowers the floor 
prices at which solar and wind resources could bid into the capacity market, 
among other provisions.25 
Recommendation 
To remove the substantial obstacles that ISO-NE and PJM MOPRs place on 
nuclear power and new renewable energy resources, Congress should direct 
FERC to categorically exempt new renewable resources and existing nuclear 
power plants from all MOPRs. The ability of these resources to request case-
by-case exemptions from the MOPR is too onerous and will slow the rapid 
additions of low-carbon resources that many state policies require. Congress 
should also consider banning MOPRs altogether to make for “cleaner” law 
without an excess of complex exemptions. Indeed, some states are 
contemplating withdrawing from the RTO capacity markets, or even the RTO 
entirely, simply to avoid MOPR policies. This will make the transport of 
electricity into these states more cumbersome and, ultimately, more 
expensive for electricity users. This problem could be avoided simply by 
removing the MOPR impediment that is spurring a potential exodus from 
otherwise-important RTOs.  
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Proposed Policy: Expanded Federal Authority over Electric 
Transmission Line Siting and Eminent Domain 
By Alexandra B. Klass 
Background and Context 
Electricity transmission lines constitute critical infrastructure needed to 
integrate more renewable energy into the electric grid, particularly by 
transporting large-scale wind energy where it exists in the Midwest and 
Plains states to population centers several states away. Transmission lines 
are often controversial and sometimes meet with opposition by affected 
landowners and private property rights advocates. Outdated state laws 
provide a legal hook that enables opponents to block interstate 
transmission lines. This has led to fatal roadblocks for several interstate 
transmission projects, most notably those proposed by the merchant 
transmission line company Clean Line Energy Partners. Particularly for the 
interstate electric transmission lines required to transport wind energy from 
the middle, less populated parts of the country to population centers, the in-
state need is often less compelling than the larger regional or national need 
for such lines. As a result, opponents argue that regional need or national 
need for renewable energy cannot justify the use of land for a project if the 
line will not bring significant amounts of electricity to state residents or 
lower the price of electricity in the state.  
In addition, some states allow only “public utilities” to apply for permits. That 
has prevented some private merchant transmission line companies 
developing interstate transmission lines from obtaining required permits.  
Beyond barriers posed by landowner opposition and antiquated state policy, 
state eminent domain authority is predicated on demonstrating that the 
land is being taken for a “public use.” Where the transmission lines are 
intended to cross a state, relaying energy from out-of-state generators to 
out-of-state residents, rather than providing transmission from an in-state 
source or to in-state residents, landowners have questioned whether there is 
a “public use” justifying the exercise of state eminent domain authority. 
State courts have in some cases invalidated the use of eminent domain 
authority on such grounds.  
Individual landowner and community opposition to large electric 
transmission lines is understandable. Most transmission lines are not buried, 
and they thus can be aesthetically unpleasing and create environmental 
harm, such as habitat fragmentation, if not carefully planned. Furthermore, 
as with the siting of other large infrastructure, they can be placed in areas 
where developers face—or perceive to face—the least opposition, including 
areas with relatively low land values. This can result in environmental justice 
concerns, since the cheaper land developers favor is often home to low-
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income and minority communities. Any policy that federalizes the siting of 
transmission lines must carefully account for the impacts of these lines and 
ensure that environmental justice issues are centrally considered within the 
siting process. Existing federal laws, if applied correctly, should help to 
ensure this careful consideration—particularly the National Environmental 
Policy Act. Additionally, there should be further federal emphasis on and 
support for distributed renewable resources, such as rooftop solar, that 
avoid the need for new, large transmission infrastructure in the first place.  
In several instances in the past, Congress has acted to expand federal siting 
or eminent domain authority precisely to overcome state barriers similar to 
the ones described above. For example: 
Natural gas pipelines: Congress created federal siting and nationwide 
eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines under the 
Natural Gas Act of 1938 (with amendments in 1947) to 
override state regulatory barriers to such projects. 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) 
now has authority to grant a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity for such projects, as well 
as to grant nationwide eminent domain authority if 
the project meets economic and environmental 
requirements.  
Liquefied natural gas: Congress created federal 
siting authority (but not eminent domain authority) 
for liquefied natural gas (LNG) import and export 
terminals in the Energy Policy Act of 2005, in 
response to concerns that state regulators were 
blocking these projects and that national energy needs 
would be compromised as a result.  
Cell phone towers: In the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress 
responded to concerns over local opposition to new cell phone towers by 
allowing local governments to retain siting authority but creating new, 
federal standards for how local governments should process the 
applications, preempting local government prohibitions on cell phone 
towers, creating strict timelines for local approval, and authorizing 
expedited review of local decisions in federal court.  
Recommendations 
• Congress should expand federal authority over the approval of new 
interstate electric transmission lines to support greater integration of 
renewable energy into the U.S. electric grid. Congress could combine this 
expansion of federal authority over transmission lines with greater 
scrutiny of FERC’s practices with regard to the siting and eminent 
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domain for interstate natural gas pipelines and other fossil fuel 
infrastructure within FERC’s existing jurisdiction. 
• Congress could accomplish this by granting FERC siting authority over 
interstate electric transmission lines, as well as authorizing FERC to 
approve eminent domain authority for such lines. This would be 
consistent with existing federal law under the Natural Gas Act that 
governs siting approval and eminent domain authority for natural gas 
pipelines.  
• In the alternative, Congress could leave siting and eminent domain 
authority with the states but create additional procedural requirements 
and expedited review of permit denials in federal court as was done in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for cell phone towers.  
• Congress could amend existing provisions in the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 to clarify that FERC has authority to override state denials of siting 
permits in certain circumstances and thus reverse federal court decisions 
to the contrary.26  
• As part of an expansion of federal authority over transmission lines, 
Congress could reform the Natural Gas Act to require FERC to consider 
GHG emissions as part of that agency’s review process for granting siting 
certificates and eminent domain authority for natural gas pipelines and 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) import and export terminals. FERC’s process 
for approving these controversial fossil fuel projects has been subject to 
significant criticism for the climate change impacts of such projects as 
well as the interference with landowner property rights. Thus, Congress 
could combine expanded federal authority over clean energy projects 
like transmission lines with greater scrutiny of fossil fuel projects like 
pipelines and LNG terminals.  
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Transportation Policy and the Climate Crisis 
By Alexandra B. Klass, Hannah J. Wiseman, and Alice Kaswan 
Summary 
Cars, trucks, and other modes of transportation are the leading cause of 
climate change in the United States. Two major policy changes in the 
transportation sector will therefore be necessary to substantially reduce U.S. 
carbon emissions. First, direct carbon emissions from cars, trucks, and other 
vehicles must be reduced through further fuel efficiency requirements and 
the electrification of the vehicle fleet. Second, policy tools must incentivize 
or mandate practices that reduce the number of vehicle miles driven each 
year, through better land use planning, for example. This white paper 
focuses on the first set of tools—those that directly reduce 
carbon emissions from individual vehicles—but 
also briefly touches upon methods for reducing 
the use of cars and trucks. We also propose 
that investments in alternative vehicles 
prioritize reductions in frontline 
communities, so as to maximize co-
pollutant reduction benefits and address 
longstanding racial and economic inequities in 
pollution exposures. 
As required by the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA) had jointly 
implemented ambitious standards to reduce carbon emissions from 
vehicles, primarily by requiring more efficient vehicles27 and approving 
California’s alternative standards, which included zero-emission vehicle 
requirements. But recent final rules issued by the Trump Administration—
the Safer Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule28—reversed much of 
this progress. A new Congress or administration should reinstate the 
previous progress. The electrification of vehicles, in turn, will require more 
governmental support for the purchase of electric vehicles and the 
installation of charging infrastructure. We explore these needed policy tools 
and the potential roles of the federal government, states, and local 
governments in implementing these tools, and we set forth the following 
recommendations, each discussed in more detail below. The top priorities 
for a more widespread and rapid transition to vehicle electrification and 
reduction in miles driven should include the following. 
Recommendation #1: Congress should direct the Department of Energy 
(DOE), in concert with auto manufacturers and state and local governments, 
to plan for the optimal location of additional charging infrastructure on 
federal and state highways.  
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Recommendation #2: Through direct budgetary measures and competitive 
grant programs, Congress should fund the installation of charging 
infrastructure on federal and state highways and at workplaces. 
Recommendation #3: Beyond what is already proposed in the CLEAN 
Future Act, Congress should direct the DOE to establish a multi-stakeholder 
committee to write a model state building code for the location and 
connection of EV charging stations near buildings and in parking lots, a 
model state code for the rates charged for the use of EV chargers (if any), 
recommended methods and rate structures for compensating customers for 
sales of electricity from car batteries to utilities, and a recommendation that 
states exempt EV chargers from the definition of “public utility.”  
Recommendation #4: Congress should enact new legislation to expand the 
subsidization of electric vehicles. This legislation should include 
subsidization of the transition away from diesel fuels used in trucks and 
buses. Through this legislation, Congress should also consider converting 
the subsidization of electric vehicles from a tax credit to a rebate, eliminating 
subsidies for natural gas vehicles, and reserving a substantial percentage of 
rebates and other incentives for low-income consumers.  
Recommendation #5: Congress should expand existing funding for public 
mass transit and land use planning that reduces vehicle miles traveled, 
particularly in and through frontline communities. As recommended by the 
Select Committee on the Climate Crisis, Congress should direct the 
Department of Energy to establish performance measures for Metropolitan 
Planning Organizations to include metrics such as enhancing urban infill, 
ensuring that new housing is located closer to existing transportation, and 
similar metrics.  
Recommendation #6: We highlight a theme running through all of the prior 
recommendations: Congress should direct clean transportation investments 
and land use planning improvements to low-income and frontline 
communities. 
Background 
Vehicles recently surpassed power plants as the leading contributor of 
carbon pollution in the United States.29 Air pollution from the transportation 
sector is directly associated with the number of vehicles on the road, miles 
driven, and the efficiency (and thus emissions per mile) of vehicles.30 The 
average annual number of miles driven by Americans continues to increase, 
as do the total number of registered vehicles on highways.31 Americans 
continue to purchase cars and trucks and drive more miles due to personal 
preferences, land use patterns, and the lack of adequate alternative modes 
of transportation, among other factors.  
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Health and Environmental Co-Benefits. Beyond producing carbon 
emissions, transportation also emits more damaging air pollution than any 
other sector. In 2005, researchers from MIT and other universities 
comprehensively studied mature deaths from air pollution and found that 
cars and trucks cause 53,000 early deaths annually in the United States, as 
compared to 52,000 early deaths caused by power generation.32 A more 
recent study shows 107,000 premature U.S. deaths from fine particulate air 
pollution, with 28 percent of those deaths caused by transportation as 
compared to 14 percent from electricity generation and 15 percent from 
agriculture.33 Diesel particulate pollution from trucks, buses, ships, and rail 
presents particularly high health risks. 
Economic Benefits for Consumers: Improved fuel efficiency can reduce 
gasoline costs, increasing the money available to U.S. consumers for non-
transportation uses. Better fuel efficiency could also reduce the impact of 
potential oil price increases on the U.S. economy. Despite 
these economic benefits, fuel-efficiency standards and 
financial incentives are necessary because the market 
does not adequately incentivize consumers to demand 
and auto companies to produce more fuel-efficient 
vehicles and EVs. Consumers frequently focus on short-
term rather than long-term costs, and may undervalue 
the long-term cost savings associated with electric cars.34 
Job Creation Benefits: Despite Trump administration 
claims that electrification will cause job losses, 
incentivizing the manufacture and sale of more EVs 
could increase jobs—indeed, perhaps double them by 
2030, according to some sources.35 
A critical mechanism for greening transportation is to 
electrify the vehicle fleet, particularly now that a declining 
percentage of electricity comes from carbon-intensive coal. 
Successful electrification, in turn, requires enhanced charging infrastructure 
and use of vehicle-to-grid technologies so that electric car drivers can 
maximize the value of their cars. Because low-income consumers and small 
businesses are unlikely to be able to afford the initial investment in clean 
vehicles, federal support should prioritize transportation investments in 
frontline communities. 
Reducing the number of vehicles and miles traveled by those vehicles is 
another important way to lower transportation sector emissions. Indeed, 
reductions in carbon and other pollutant emissions through vehicle 
efficiency measures can be offset if more people drive and drive more miles. 
We therefore also discuss public transportation and improved land use 
planning approaches in this paper.  
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There are three primary ways to directly reduce carbon emissions from 
individual vehicles for each mile driven, including making vehicles more 
efficient, transforming the vehicle fleet from a gasoline-powered fleet to an 
electric one, and reducing how much we drive. The first strategy, increasing 
vehicle efficiency, has historically been a success story, and, under recent 
regulations, efficiency was on course to further improve. But the steady 
increase in average miles per gallon of the vehicle fleet was recently limited 
by a Trump Administration regulation. The electrification of vehicles is a 
more complex endeavor that requires integrating several policy approaches, 
as explored below. And finally, inducing Americans to stop driving, or to 
reduce miles driven through public transportation and metropolitan land 
use planning, is a critical and challenging policy approach.  
Proposed Policy: Increase Vehicle Efficiency through 
Improved Regulation 
By Hannah J. Wiseman 
Background and Context 
The Clean Air Act requires the regulation of harmful air pollutants from cars, 
and under the terms of that landmark law, the EPA has established and 
repeatedly updated vehicle emissions standards. In 2007, the Supreme 
Court, in Massachusetts v. EPA, held that the law applied to 
carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles, and required EPA 
to regulate carbon emissions from vehicles or justify a 
decision not to so regulate. In 2009, the Obama 
Administration proceeded to regulate vehicle carbon 
emissions, and, because the mechanisms for reducing 
carbon emissions overlap considerably with the 
mechanisms for increasing efficiency, ordered EPA to 
coordinate with the National Highway Transportation 
and Safety Agency’s issuance of fuel efficiency 
standards.36 These agencies collaborated to issue joint 
fuel efficiency and greenhouse gas (GHG) emission 
standards.37  
Though harmonized to ease manufacturer compliance, these standards are 
important independently. The Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) 
standards, expressed in miles per gallon, reflected NHTSA’s statutory 
mandate to conserve oil, while EPA’s GHG emission standards reflected the 
Clean Air Act’s statutory mandate to regulate pollutants that endanger 
health and welfare. 
The Trump Administration 
recently finalized a rule that 
would freeze emission standards 
at the 2020 number, with no 
further improvements through 
2025. As a result, efficiency 
standards are set to increase by 
just 1.5 percent annually 
between 2021 and 2026. 
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Recommendations 
Since this initial drafting of the CAFE standards, NHTSA and the EPA further 
strengthened these requirements, with continued improvements in vehicle 
efficiency through 2025.38 However, the Trump Administration recently 
finalized a rule that would freeze emission standards at the 2020 number, 
with no further improvements through 2025. As a result, efficiency standards 
are set to increase by just 1.5 percent annually between 2021 and 2026.39 A 
separately issued part of the rule represented a significant departure from 
past practice: NHTSA concluded that the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act, which governs vehicle efficiency standards, preempts California’s 
greenhouse gas emissions limits and its requirements for zero-emission 
vehicles.40 Although the Clean Air Act generally permits California to 
establish more stringent standards and allows other states to follow 
California's lead, NHTSA and EPA have precluded California from playing 
that leadership role for GHG emissions. 
A simple fix would be for Congress to direct the EPA and NHTSA to repeal 
these rules, reinstate California’s ability to require zero-emission vehicles and 
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars, and reinstate the former, 
more stringent, federal efficiency improvements and vehicle emissions 
standards rules. 
Proposed Policy: Enhance Measures to Further Electrify the 
Vehicle Fleet  
By Alexandra B. Klass, Alice Kaswan, and Hannah Wiseman 
Background and Context 
More efficient cars emit fewer greenhouse gas emissions, but deep 
reductions in emissions from vehicles will not be achieved until substantial 
numbers of gasoline-powered vehicles are replaced with electric vehicles, 
which emit zero carbon when powered by zero-carbon electricity. This will 
require more ambitious zero-emission vehicle (ZEV) mandates as well as 
further subsidization of electric vehicle purchases and charging 
infrastructure. 
Recommendations 
Enhance manufacturer zero-emission vehicle mandates. Manufacturer 
mandates are designed to stimulate industry innovation – to force 
automakers to develop emission-free technology. The Obama 
Administration’s joint CAFE and GHG emissions standards were somewhat 
technology-forcing because they encouraged manufacturers to achieve the 
standards through some degree of vehicle electrification.41 As 
manufacturers provide more low- and zero-emission vehicles, the average 
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emissions from their vehicles goes down, enabling the attainment of 
stringent fleet-based efficiency and emissions standards. Explicit zero-
emission vehicle mandates, like those developed by California and adopted 
by a range of other states, have provided an even more direct technology-
forcing incentive.42  
The Zero-Emissions Vehicles Act of 2019 (H.R. 2764/S. 1487) offers a more 
ambitious approach. The proposed bill would amend the Clean Air Act to 
require manufacturers of passenger vehicles to deliver for sale 50 percent 
electric vehicles and other zero emissions vehicles by 2030 and 100 percent 
by 2040.43 If enacted, this Act would advance transportation emission 
reductions more quickly than Obama-era vehicle standards. Indeed, the 
House Select Committee on the Climate Crisis has proposed an even more 
aggressive timeline, recommending that beginning in 2035, all new 
passenger vehicles sold should be zero-emission vehicles and that all new 
heavy-duty trucks should be zero-emission vehicles beginning in 2040.44 
Further subsidize electric vehicle purchases. The existing federal tax credit 
for electric vehicles has been somewhat effective at incentivizing their 
purchase. But under current federal law, the tax credit of $7,500 declines and 
phases out completely after an automaker sells 200,000 EVs. As a result, tax 
credits are no longer available for EV purchases from Tesla or 
General Motors (which manufacturers the Chevy Bolt).45 
Further subsidization of electric vehicle purchases will 
be necessary to spur a large-scale consumer switch to 
electric vehicles. Members of Congress have already 
introduced bills to do precisely that. The Driving 
America Forward Act (H.R. 2256/S. 1094) would provide 
a tax credit of up to $7,000 with a vehicle cap of 600,000 
total vehicles per automaker.46 The Electric Credit 
Access Ready at Sale (Electric CARS) Act of 2019 (H.R. 
2042/S. 993) would repeal the vehicle cap altogether 
and extend the $7,500 tax credit through December 31, 
2029.47 
Moreover, although tax credits can be effective in spurring new vehicle 
sales, a federal rebate may be even more effective. Studies have shown that 
EV incentive programs are most effective when the incentive is very clear to 
car sellers and buyers and when the benefits of the incentive accrue at or 
near the time of sale.48 A rebate offered at the time of sale would likely 
inspire more consumers to purchase an EV, and it might also be a clearer 
instrument for automobile salespeople to understand and promote. Studies 
have demonstrated that car dealership sales personnel often do not 
understand EVs, do not have appropriate incentives to sell them, and steer 
customers towards non-EVs even when customers express interest in 
purchasing EVs.49 Likewise, some vehicle retailers are even unaware of the 
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existing federal EV tax credits and fail to tell potential customers about these 
credits.  
Substantial rebates are also essential if proposed mandates for electric 
vehicles go into effect. If by 2035 or a similar date all passenger vehicles sold 
must be zero-emission vehicles, this mandate will disproportionately affect 
lower-income new car buyers who cannot afford these more expensive 
vehicles. Further, these mandates – if not accompanied by adequate rebates 
–might push many new-car buyers to purchase used, gasoline-powered 
vehicles instead, thus substantially negating the intended benefits of 
mandating a zero-emission vehicle fleet.   
In addition to passenger vehicles, further incentives are needed to spur the 
electrification of buses and medium- and heavy-duty trucks. California has 
been a leader in truck electrification, requiring truck manufacturers to 
increase the percentage of zero-emission trucks sold, requiring 40 to 75 
percent zero-emission trucks by 2035, with the specific level and target date 
varying by class of truck.50 As noted above, a federal House committee 
recommends that heavy duty trucks be fully zero-emission by 2040. Federal 
legislation should emulate this approach and provide funding for the 
purchase of electric trucks and further advancement of electric truck 
technology. The proposed draft CLEAN Future Act takes one step toward 
this needed support by creating a pilot program with federal grants that 
would support projects to electrify refrigerated trucks.51 
Beyond trucks, deep reductions in carbon emissions from transportation will 
require more widespread electrification of buses. Several existing federal 
programs take important steps toward this effort. The Federal Transit 
Administration awards grants for public bus fleets, and these grants support 
a variety of projects, such as upgrading bus terminals. One permitted use of 
the funds is to assist the replacement of buses in fleets with battery-electric 
buses, with 2020 grants supporting these efforts in places like Davis, 
California, and the County of Suffolk, New York.52 The proposed Green Bus 
Act of 2019 would require all of these funds to be used to purchase zero-
emission buses as of October 1, 2029.53 The DOT’s Low-No Program, already 
in place, specifically “provides funding to State and local governmental 
authorities for the purchase or lease of zero-emission and low-emission 
transit buses.”54 Continued federal support for these types of projects will be 
essential. Current law, the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation (FAST) 
Act, only authorized funding through FY 2020, which ended on September 
30, 2020.55  
With respect to school buses, under the Diesel Emissions Reduction Act of 
2010 (DERA), the EPA annually issues $15,000 or $20,000 rebates to public 
and private school bus fleet owners who replace diesel buses with EPA-
certified clean buses, including, among others, battery-powered buses.56 
The CLEAN Future Act would amend existing programs for the retrofitting of 
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school buses to include grants specifically for retrofitting buses to make 
them “low or zero emissions.”57 As with other buses, continued federal 
funding for replacement and retrofitting of school buses will be critical.  
Expand incentives and planning for the installation of EV charging 
infrastructure. Federal planning incentives for EV charging infrastructure 
and charging corridors are perhaps even more important than consumer 
vehicle purchase incentives. Studies have shown that large numbers of 
potential customers will not purchase an EV until they have assurances that 
they will be able to easily charge the EV at home, at public charging stations, 
at workplaces, and on highway charging corridors during long-distance 
travel.  
Expand the funding of charging infrastructure. With regard to tax 
incentives for installing charging infrastructure, Congress enacted a tax 
credit for alternative fuel vehicle refueling property in 2005, 
extended it several times until it expired in 2017, and then 
revived it to extend through the end of 2020.58 The credit 
is 30 percent of the cost of qualified property, with a 
$30,000 limit for businesses at each location and a limit of 
$1,000 for a taxpayer’s residential property.59 Like other 
temporary tax credits that may or may not be extended, 
the efficacy of this credit is limited by uncertainty 
surrounding its durability. The Electric CARS Act of 2019 
(S. 993/H.R. 2042) would extend the credit through 2029. 
If extended or made permanent, similar tax credits could 
support new investment in higher-voltage EV charging at 
homes, at workplaces, in parking lots, and at such commercial 
establishments as grocery stores, shopping malls, or gas stations.60 However, 
this tax credit would not help incentivize construction on highway corridors 
of the Level 3 direct current fast chargers (DCFC) more suited to long-
distance travel. This is because Level 3 chargers are significantly more costly 
than Level 2 chargers, and thus the tax credit will not significantly reduce the 
high, up-front infrastructure costs of this infrastructure. Congress should 
therefore consider a significantly larger tax credit for Level 3 chargers or 
create a rebate program to fund such infrastructure.  
The Clean Corridors Act of 2019 (H.R. 2616/S. 674) would create a grant 
program for state, tribal, and local governments to install publicly accessible 
EV charging infrastructure along alternative fuel corridors (on national 
highways) designated by the federal government, states, or groups of 
states.61 Under the proposed EV Freedom Act, the DOT and DOE would help 
create a network of charging infrastructure—also on national, public 
highways—by writing a plan for the location of the infrastructure and 
issuing grant for entities to install charging infrastructure in accordance with 
the plan.62 America’s Transportation Infrastructure Act of 2019 contains 
nearly identical language. This Act, if enacted, would provide $1 billion for 
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these same activities but would not be limited to EV charging infrastructure; 
it would also cover hydrogen and natural gas fueling stations.63 Similarly, the 
CLEAN Future Act would provide support for state and local government 
and private installation of charging stations.64  
Unify building standards and charging rate structures and enhance 
vehicle-to-grid capabilities. In addition to supporting the installation of 
physical charging infrastructure, the federal government needs to do more 
to enhance the uniformity of standards for charging infrastructure 
technologies and installation and to incentivize the development of 
technology and standards that will allow EV owners to sell electricity from 
their batteries to electric utilities – technology called “vehicle-to-grid” 
technology. Further, the federal government needs to do more to support 
efforts to enhance the predictability, fairness, and reasonableness of the 
rates charged for the use of charging infrastructure.  
With respect to building standards, the CLEAN Future Act proposes a model 
building code for electric vehicle supply equipment and vehicles. 
Specifically, the draft Act directs the Secretary of Energy to propose a model 
building code that would include electric vehicle charging 
infrastructure and parking in plans for commercial and 
residential buildings.65 The Leading Infrastructure for 
Tomorrow’s America Act, introduced in May 2019, 
includes identical language.66 Congress should be more 
proactive in requiring the Secretary of Energy to 
spearhead a collaborative, multi-stakeholder effort to 
develop a model uniform building code, which would 
include specifications for electric connections; more 
details with respect to the types and size of spaces in 
which charging infrastructure should be located; 
specifications regarding the empty space that should be left on or near 
commercial buildings for the charging infrastructure and its recommended 
proximity to electrical outlets; and other information.  
In addition to encouraging the installation of more charging infrastructure 
through uniform building codes, Congress should direct the DOE to form a 
multi-stakeholder committee to issue a model uniform code to states for 
ratemaking procedures associated with EV charging infrastructure. This code 
should address the issue of state utility commissions’ treatment of EV 
charging—likely with a recommendation that EV charging stations not be 
treated as public utilities. The code should also include recommendations 
for how states should regulate charging rates (if at all), and how rates could 
be developed to value and compensate electricity sold from car batteries to 
the grid through vehicle-to-grid technologies.  
Expand EV corridor planning. As noted above, a critical component of 
building sufficient EV charging infrastructure is planning and funding a 
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nationwide network of Level 3 DCFC chargers on highway corridors for long-
distance travel. In federal legislation, these corridors are typically called 
“alternative fuel corridors” or “AFCs” and federal support for these corridors 
has included planning for the installation of fueling stations for hydrogen, 
propane, and natural gas vehicles in addition to EV charging stations. For 
several reasons, however, this section focuses primarily on the importance of 
planning EV charging stations specifically. First, although hydrogen vehicles 
do not emit air pollution, they have faced a steep uphill battle in terms of 
manufacturing and deployment, and their relevance is currently marginal. 
As EVs continue to improve, they are likely to be the most important point of 
focus. Further, propane and natural gas vehicles are not zero emission 
vehicles. Although they reduce conventional air pollution in urban areas, 
which is exceedingly important given illnesses and premature deaths 
associated with this air pollution, they increase greenhouse gas emissions as 
compared to conventional gasoline-powered vehicles.67 Indeed, scientists 
have concluded that compressed natural gas-fueled vehicles “are not a 
viable mitigation strategy for climate change.”68 Planning for EV charging 
infrastructure should therefore be the highest federal priority and the focus 
of future legislation.  
Section 1413 of the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act; 
P.L. 114-94) enacted in 2015 sought to address that goal by requiring the 
U.S. Department of Transportation to designate by 2020 national AFCs to 
promote alternative vehicle use, including EVs.69 Since that time, the Federal 
Highway Administration (FHWA) has been working with industry, other 
federal agencies, and state and local governments, to plan AFCs, develop 
uniform signage, determine when highway segments are “corridor ready,” 
and help fund charging infrastructure within AFCs. FHWA has detailed 
information on the status of corridors and funding on its website.70 FHWA is 
also helping coordinate funding from other related programs, such as 
Volkswagen’s "Electrify America" investments resulting from the company’s 
vehicle emission cheating settlement with EPA and the state of California, 
and the Department of Energy’s Clean Cities Coalition Network, which helps 
state and local governments fund EV charging infrastructure.71
Congress should continue to monitor FHWA’s progress on AFCs and should 
likely provide additional funding and directives to expand the AFC effort 
well beyond 2020.  
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Proposed Policy: Reduce Vehicle Miles Traveled 
By Alice Kaswan and Hannah J. Wiseman  
Background and Context  
Moving to more efficient transportation, and particularly to battery-powered 
transportation, is critical to climate efforts in light of the large contribution 
of transportation to carbon emissions. But battery-powered transportation 
still requires electricity, and achieving zero-carbon electricity is likely to be 
challenging and will take time. Reducing the number of vehicle miles driven 
is therefore another essential component of the effort to address climate 
change. This requires the expansion of mass transit and continued efforts to 
plan new land development in a way that reduces commuting distances. 
Recommendations  
Encourage mass transit. To make low-carbon public transit more available 
to more U.S. residents, Congress should channel more funding to mass 
transit grants. This funding should build upon existing programs such as the 
Urbanized Area Formula Grants Program.72 Congress should also continue 
to fund efforts to maintain and repair mass transit 
infrastructure, including, for example, the State of Good 
Repair Grant Program. 
Congress should also consider directing the Department 
of Energy to initiate a prize-based program that would 
encourage contributors to propose cost-efficient, 
effective, and broadly accessible mass transit programs 
for specific cities. Although existing grants, including the 
Urbanized Area Formula Grants Program, include 
funding for planning and research, a competitive prize 
directed specifically at mass transit planning could 
perhaps incentivize more innovative and effective 
planning. Some mass transit systems end up resulting in 
low ridership, in part due to subpar design. If routes and 
pick-up and drop-off locations are not carefully planned 
and researched, public transit can be overbuilt and underused. 
Encourage land use planning and local infrastructure projects that 
reduce the need for driving. Land use patterns significantly affect driving 
patterns, with greater sprawl increasing vehicle miles traveled (VMT) and 
associated emissions. In addition, mass transit functions more effectively in 
higher-density communities because density helps generate sufficient 
ridership to enable frequent and dependable service. Conversely, it is 
difficult to sustain in low-density suburban and rural contexts. Facilitating 
housing near workplaces and near mass transit hubs would reduce VMT. In 
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addition, infill within underutilized urban areas could reduce continued 
sprawl. (As discussed below, however, such efforts must be carefully 
designed to address potential co-pollutant increases and gentrification.) 
Alternatives to and disincentives for vehicles, such as bicycle lanes, 
pedestrian-friendly streets, parking or access fees, could also reduce VMT.  
Although land use planning and housing are traditionally subject to local or 
state control, the federal government provides substantial funding for 
highways and transportation, and could condition highway funding on 
regional planning to reduce VMT and associated emissions. The Select 
Committee recommended legislation requiring DOT to establish 
performance measures for Metropolitan Planning Organizations (which plan 
for and dispense highway funds) to address GHG reductions, access to 
transportation systems, VMT reductions, and climate resilience, as well as 
grant programs to support state and local efforts to meet the performance 
measures.73 In addition, the Committee recommended that Congress 
require states to plan and implement transportation projects that facilitate 
biking and walking.74 
Proposed Policy: Direct Clean Transportation Investments 
to Frontline and Low-Income Communities 
By Alice Kaswan 
Background and Context  
Transportation emissions disproportionately impact frontline communities, 
which are often located close to sources of transportation emissions, 
including highways, rail lines, and ports. Moreover, people in low-income 
communities can ill afford new, zero-emission vehicles that would improve 
local conditions. As a consequence, without proactive measures to channel 
zero-emission options such as EVs and mass transit to poorer communities, 
zero-emission vehicles and their air quality benefits will be more prevalent in 
wealthy communities, and will remain out of reach for the poorer 
communities that would most benefit from air pollution reductions.  
Moreover, not all transportation emissions are equal: diesel emissions 
contain toxic particulates that pose substantial cancer risks.75 Diesel 
emissions hit many frontline communities hard, whether located near ports, 
rail depots, warehouses, or emanating from agricultural or mining 
operations.76 Addressing diesel emissions also poses a just transitions 
challenge: independent truckers, small farms, and small businesses with 
local cargo vans could find it difficult to afford new zero- or low-emission 
clean vans or trucks, even if the cost of operating the new vehicles is lower 
over time, as policymakers predict.77 Similarly, lower-income communities 
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could find it difficult to fund new zero-emission buses – for public transit and 
for schools - to replace diesel buses.  
Considering a clean transition more broadly, transportation emissions, 
which rely on individual or local purchases rather than controls on industrial 
facilities, raise a key social justice issue: who gets to participate in the 
transition to a clean economy? Carefully tailored government policies are 
necessary to ensure that frontline and low-income communities are part of 
the transition, and able to reap the opportunities and benefits associated 
with clean energy. 
Recommendations 
Prioritize diesel emission reductions and support the transition from 
diesel to zero-emission vehicles. Given the high risks posed by diesel 
pollution in frontline communities, federal climate legislation should place a 
high priority on truck and bus electrification. As noted, California’s Advanced 
Clean Truck Rule, adopted in June 2020, is already pushing manufacturers to 
develop and supply zero-emission trucks. To increase the supply of clean 
trucks, the House Select Committee recommends that climate legislation 
require a 100 percent transition to zero emission heavy-duty vehicles by 
2040,78 and recommends increased federal support for research and 
development to spur new technologies for the largest long-haul trucks 
posing the most significant decarbonization challenge. To increase demand 
for clean trucks, the Select Committee also recommends national purchase 
incentives and grants for zero-emission trucks, buses, commercial vehicles, 
and other diesel equipment, as well as support for additional infrastructure, 
like charging stations. 
In determining the distribution of funds to support a diesel transition, 
Congress should provide financial support in areas suffering from the 
heaviest diesel pollution, such as at ports, in areas with multiple warehouses 
– which function as magnets for diesel trucks – and in areas otherwise 
suffering from serious air pollution. The Select Committee’s 
recommendations repeatedly state that “EPA should prioritize grants for 
projects that would benefit environmental justice communities and other 
communities disproportionately exposed to diesel pollution.”79 Similarly, the 
Select Committee recommends that continued support for electrifying 
school buses should prioritize “[s]chool districts in underserved communities 
and communities disproportionately exposed to air pollution.”80 
Invest in clean and affordable mass transit. As noted, in communities with 
existing mass transit or sufficient density to support mass transit, we need 
increased investment in zero-emission mass transit. In most urban areas, 
frontline and low-income residents make greater use of mass transit and 
would benefit from diesel reductions inside buses and in their communities. 
Mass transit funding should require or prioritize investments that directly 
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serve, or would reduce pollution in, frontline communities. As noted, the 
Select Committee proposes at least doubling federal funding for mass 
transit and states that “[t]ransit projects that reduce air pollution and 
improve mobility in environmental justice communities and underserved 
rural areas should receive additional funds and consideration.” At the same 
time, federal legislation should direct agencies to give less priority to 
investments, like commuter rail lines, that risk triggering sprawl or would 
provide few benefits to frontline communities. Affordability is also a key 
issue, both to reduce regressive impacts on low-income residents and to 
encourage use. Federal support is likely to be necessary to enable many 
municipalities to keep transit costs low. 
Provide funds and structure for shared mobility options in frontline and 
low-income communities. Alternatives to individual car ownership are 
increasing in areas where car ownership is not necessary on a daily basis, but 
mass transit cannot meet all needs. The specific needs are likely to vary 
considerably, and local communities are best situated to identify the options 
that would work best for them. Frontline and low-income communities 
without sufficient resources will need federal support to realize these 
options. California, for example, has adopted an incentive program for car 
sharing and “clean mobility options” in disadvantaged communities where 
residents lack accessible or sufficient public transportation.81 
Through land use measures to reduce VMT, address the needs and 
concerns of frontline and low-income communities. In some areas, like 
California, the lack of affordable housing near workplaces has resulted in 
poorer residents moving farther afield to find housing, substantially 
increasing transportation emissions. Conversely, urban infill 
development designed to bring suburban residents 
closer could lead to gentrification in urban low-income 
areas. That gentrification would not only adversely 
impact these households but could also induce lower-
income residents to move out of the city, undermining 
the infill development’s VMT-reducing objectives. 
In addition, land use measures that reduce VMT and 
overall emissions could nonetheless cause localized 
pollution increases. Until most vehicles are zero-
emission, denser development could increase urban 
pollution. And if transit-oriented developments are 
located along highways, they could expose residents to 
high levels of pollution typically found adjacent to major roadways. 
Land use planning measures to reduce VMT will be an important part of the 
policy mix, but they cannot occur in a vacuum. Planners, working with 
affected communities, should integrate housing and public health factors to 
generate holistic plans for just and sustainable development. The Select 
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Committee specifically recommends that Congress incentivize not simply 
housing near transit, but the provision of affordable housing near transit, to 
provide greater access to opportunities and reduce the need to drive for 
low-income residents.82 That recommendation is a start, but more 
comprehensive integration of affordable housing and access to work, health 
care, and education should be integrated into sustainable land use planning.  
Reserve consumer car rebates for low-income households. Because 
individual car ownership may be less prevalent in the future, we have not 
prioritized incentives for individual car ownership. Some role for cars is, 
however, inevitable, and so such incentives should be included in federal 
legislation. There is some evidence that most of the benefits of federal 
passenger vehicle tax incentives have, however, gone to wealthy 
households that would likely have been able to afford the vehicles without 
the tax relief.83 Tax incentives facilitating new and used electric car 
purchases by low-income households would concentrate support in the 
communities where such support is most necessary.84 In addition, it would 
foster electric vehicle ownership in the communities where transitioning 
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Federal Public Lands Policy and the Climate 
Crisis 
By Robert L. Fischman, Christine A. Klein, Daniel J. Rohlf, and Sandra B. 
Zellmer 
Summary 
The concept of “sustainability” is embedded in numerous laws governing 
federal land management. With respect to the nation’s rangelands and 
forests, Congress directs the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the U.S. 
Forest Service to manage under principles of multiple-use sustained yield. In 
addition the BLM must prevent “unnecessary or undue degradation” of 
lands under its jurisdiction, while the U.S. Forest Service must provide for 
“diversity of plant and animal communities.” The dominant-use public land 
systems have more conservation-oriented missions. The National Park 
Service must manage units by such means as will leave their resources 
“unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations,” while the Fish & 
Wildlife Service must manage wildlife refuges to maintain “the biological 
integrity, diversity, and environmental health of the System … for the 
benefit of present and future generations.” The Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), an often 
overlooked public lands management agency, 
must manage the coastal zone in a manner 
“consistent” with approved state coastal 
management programs, which in turn 
seek to “preserve, protect, develop, and 
where possible, to restore or enhance, the 
resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this 
and succeeding generations.”  
Achieving the sustainability goal has become more urgent than ever due to 
rapidly changing climate and human-driven development patterns. In order 
to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their needs, we propose four categories 
of legislative reforms to promote ecological, social, and economic 
sustainability on and through the nation’s public lands. 
Recommendation #1: Enact sequential mitigation and net conservation 
benefit legislation requiring all federal land managers to use sequential 
mitigation to establish a net conservation benefit goal or, at a minimum, a 
"no net loss" of wetlands goal. 
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Recommendation #3: Create biodiversity resilience funds to promote 
restoration of biodiversity on federal and non-federal lands. 
Recommendation #4: Legislate portions of the national forest planning 
rules to ensure sustainability in the face of climate change. 
Proposed Policy: Sequential Mitigation and Net 
Conservation Benefit 
By Robert L. Fischman 
Background and Context 
Federal public lands are subject to various forms of commodity, recreational, 
and energy development. Organic legislation establishing the framework for 
managing public resources typically provides a standard for determining 
which activities or impacts might be permissible. Even the 
National Park System may authorize projects that create 
adverse impacts on ecosystems as long as they do not 
rise to the level of impairing park resources for future 
generations. Congress provides similar thresholds for the 
other major public lands systems, such as national 
wildlife refuges (ensure “maintenance of biological 
integrity, diversity, and environmental health,” and 
compatibility with other refuge objectives), BLM 
resources (“prevent unnecessary or undue degradation”), 
and national forests (providing for biodiversity and 
permitting logging where it is physically suitable for 
watershed conditions, restocking will occur within five 
years, and aquatic resources are protected).  
When enacted decades ago, the restrictions in federal public land law were 
major steps forward in conservation. They were written to stop agencies 
from repeating egregious mistakes, such as uses incompatible with wildlife 
protection in the refuges and clear-cutting that dumped sediment by mass 
wasting in the forests. While they have succeeded in limiting the worst 
activities, they lack any requirement that people profiting from federal lands 
pay the full cost of the harm they cause. As a result, even projects that meet 
the congressionally mandated requirements individually often have adverse 
ecological effects cumulatively. Federal resources suffer from death-by-a-
thousand blows, as incremental harms add up to continual degradation. This 
unfortunate shortcoming is manifest in declining biodiversity and ecological 
services, such as water purification, upon which Americans rely.  
Sequential mitigation, which is widely practiced in national and international 
programs, is a strategy to arrest biodiversity and ecosystem services decline 
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from land degradation.85 The strategy is sequential because it first seeks to 
avoid harms, then to minimize whatever harms cannot be avoided, and 
finally to mitigate whatever harms remain from ecologically impairing 
activity. The strategy has played an important role in the United States by 
reducing national net loss of wetlands through the Clean Water Act’s fill 
permit program, and by preventing extinctions in the incidental take permit 
program of the Endangered Species Act. Sequential mitigation is the gold 
standard for both recovering biodiversity lost to development as well as 
ensuring that the public is compensated, in-kind, for the resources it 
sacrifices through permitting and other decision-making processes.  
Yet, federal public land management lacks sequential mitigation 
requirements. And the programs that do exist are vulnerable to shifts in 
priorities of the executive branch. For instance, the Obama administration 
attempted to require compensatory mitigation through a presidential 
memorandum, a tool that is notoriously unenforceable. Some agencies, 
including the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, began to operationalize the 
mandate of the memorandum, but the Trump administration succeeded in 
undoing those agency efforts.  
Recommendation 
Congress should codify and expand upon the Obama memorandum. It 
should enact legislation requiring all federal land managers to use 
sequential mitigation to establish a net benefit goal or, at a minimum, a "no 
net loss" goal applicable to any impairment of the public lands, temporary or 
permanent, in biodiversity and ecological functions. It would supplement 
rather than replace the existing threshold requirements for determining 
which projects may proceed on federal lands.  
Avoiding degradation is more likely to succeed than attempts to mitigate 
the impact from such degradation. When a resource's value is determined to 
be irreplaceable, avoidance would be the preferred goal. Instead of 
compensating to an even trade, the statute could require a "net 
conservation benefit" for all federal permits and projects. In that way, the 
uncertainty of successful minimization and mitigation itself is incorporated 
into the compensation demanded by the public for use of federal resources. 
It also creates a more accurate price signal for prospective consumers of 
federal public resources. Any doubts about the extent of ecological damage 
to be mitigated should be resolved in favor of providing a net conservation 
benefit.  
Sequential mitigation and net conservation benefit is a strategy tested and 
refined over the years by existing federal programs by such agencies as the 
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 
and the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service (though in its role under the Endangered 
Species Act, not as a federal land manager). Agencies and permittees already 
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have the tools to fulfill a sequential mitigation requirement of net 
conservation benefit. For instance, the Fish & Wildlife Service’s incidental 
take permit program employs such measures as: 
• avoiding the impact on protected species and habitat through project 
design, 
• minimizing the impact through best management practices, 
• minimizing the impact by reducing or eliminating other threats, and 
• mitigating (offsetting) impacts by restoration of degraded habitat, 
enhancement of functional habitat, preservation of habitat, creation of 
new habitat, and translocating or repatriating species. 
It is time for Congress to end its decades-long neglect of federal land 
management legislation and act to stop the degradation of public resources. 
It should extend sequential mitigation and net conservation benefit 
requirements to all federal land and resource management programs under 
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the National Forest 
Management Act, the National Park Service Organic Act, and the National 
Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act.  
Proposed Policy: Phase Out Nonrenewable Energy 
Development on Federal Lands 
By Christine A. Klein 
Background and Context 
Congress has long required that federal public lands be put to sustainable 
uses, benefitting both present and future generations. Despite these 
mandates, federal fossil fuel leasing – both onshore and offshore – has 
encouraged the production of climate-destabilizing forms of energy. Almost 
24 percent of the crude oil, natural gas, and coal produced in the United 
States is derived from the federal lands, and the combustion of such 
nonrenewable fuels under federal leases accounted for almost 24 percent of 
carbon dioxide emissions by the United States between 2005 and 2014. To 
close this gap between public lands law and practice, Congress should 
expressly forbid new leases related to fossil fuel development and prohibit 
renewal of existing, nonproductive leases. 
This course-correction would reduce outdated market subsidies for 
nonrenewable fuels that render clean energy less competitive. By some 
accounts, annual subsidies for fossil fuel production on federal lands total 
about $7 billion, the elimination of which would more than compensate for 
the loss of royalties from federal leases. A prohibition against the issuance of 
new leases on federal lands – coupled with the nonrenewal of existing, 
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nonproductive leases – could lessen carbon dioxide emissions and reduce 
industry infrastructure investments that lock us into a fossil fuel economy. 
Restricting fossil fuel production on federal lands would also contribute to 
climate justice. Communities of color and low-income communities suffer 
disproportionately from the refining of fossil fuels. According to one study 
by the Clean Air Task Force and the NAACP, in some states, 20 percent or 
more of the African American population lives within half a mile of a fossil 
fuel production, processing, or storage facility. Likewise, 
such communities suffer disproportionately from the 
combustion of fossil fuels by coal-fired power plants. 
More broadly, vulnerable communities suffer more 
from the impacts of climate change perpetuated by 
activities such as the use of fossil fuels. 
When the federal land systems were established – in 
some cases more than a century ago – we lacked 
widespread awareness of how fossil fuel use 
destabilizes Earth’s climate. At that time, leaving 
carbon-based fuels in the ground may have been 
unthinkable. But today, it is the continued development 
of such dirty fuels from another era that is becoming 
increasingly unthinkable. As the Fourth National 
Climate Assessment of 2017 acknowledges, “human 
activities, especially emissions of greenhouse … gases, 
[are] the dominant cause” of an increase in the global average temperature 
of about 1.8 degrees Fahrenheit from 1901 to 2016. The federal public lands 
can be part of the climate change solution, rather than the problem.  
Recommendations 
Prohibiting use of federal lands for fossil fuel production is not a new idea. 
Models for action include former Vice President Joe Biden’s climate plan 
(banning new oil and gas permitting on public lands and waters) and H.R. 
2242, Keep It in the Ground Act of 2017 (proposing prohibition on BOEM’s 
and the BLM’s ability to issue, renew, reinstate, or extend any nonproducing 
lease, or to authorize exploration or production of fossil fuels in specified 
areas). Congress should phase out nonrenewable energy development on 
federal lands and waters by adopting the following measures: 
New leases: Prohibit all new leases for fossil fuel exploration and 
development on federal lands, both onshore and offshore. This could be 
accomplished by amendment of organic acts for the national parks, national 
forests, national wildlife refuges, and BLM lands, as well as amendment of 
the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act. Alternatively, this could be accomplished by the passage of a new 
federal lands and waters act. 
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Phase out existing leases: Prohibit federal agencies from renewing, 
reinstating, or extending any nonproducing leases that have not yet vested 
as property rights that would trigger just compensation for governmental 
“takings.” Explore funding sources to buy out particularly problematic 
existing leases. 
Proposed Policy: Create Biodiversity Resilience Funds 
By Daniel J. Rohlf 
Background and Context 
Biodiversity – the variety of life on Earth, the ecosystems that sustain life, and 
the genetic diversity species contain – provides humans with enormously 
valuable services and resources, ranging from pollinating our crops to 
forming the genetic building blocks of new medicines and products. 
Adverse impacts on this natural asset not only imperil these benefits, but are 
the root cause of the unparalleled health and economic devastation of the 
current COVID-19 pandemic and the seeds of similarly devastating events in 
the future. Humans also share tangible and intangible connections with the 
other species that share this planet. These connections are evident in 
innumerable ways – the physical and cultural importance of other species to 
indigenous cultures, the joys of teaching our children about whales, lions, 
and elephants, and the thrill of seeing animals in the wild to name just a few.  
Importantly, intact biodiversity also promotes resilience in the face of a 
changing climate. For example, wetlands provide vital wildlife habitat, purify 
and store water supplies, and serve as natural buffers against storm surges 
and flooding that are increasing as climate change causes increased weather 
extremes. Forests store vast amounts of carbon and protect watersheds and 
wildlife, while in an urban setting an abundant tree canopy saves energy by 
providing natural cooling services to dwelling and businesses, improves air 
quality, and even provides direct health benefits to city-dwellers. Moreover, 
the genetic code of plants and animals that thrive in extreme conditions can 
help us make our food supply more resilient on an increasingly 
unpredictable planet.  
While important provisions of federal law limit adverse impacts to 
biodiversity, particularly on federal lands, governments and landowners 
often lack the resources to reverse past damage to ecosystems and wildlife, 
and to take action to restore these crucial systems. For example, the federal 
Endangered Species Act outlaws federal actions that “jeopardize” 
endangered species or destroy their critical habitat, but actions outlined in 
recovery plans to restore those same species and habitats are often stymied 
due to grossly inadequate federal appropriations. Similarly, programs 
providing incentives to private property owners to protect and restore 
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habitat on their land – actions that would benefit society as a whole – are 
often nonexistent or woefully underfunded.  
Even worse, current federal law includes some financial provisions that 
discourage or stand in the way of protecting biodiversity and adapting to 
climate change. For example, debt that federal power marketing agencies 
owe to the U.S. Treasury can discourage actions to restore biodiversity. The 
Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), a federal agency that markets 
hydroelectric power from federal dams in the Columbia River Basin, is in 
financial trouble in part because the agency is still paying off decades-old 
public debt for the cost of never-completed nuclear power plants. BPA has 
therefore staunchly opposed investments that it acknowledges would take a 
significant step toward restoring endangered salmon and steelhead runs, 
such as breaching the four outdated federal dams on the lower Snake River. 
In a similar vein, the Federal Emergency Management Agency continues to 
pay to rebuild homes and buildings in flood zones many times over, despite 
the certain knowledge that climate change is increasing the frequency of 
flooding in precisely those areas. As a result, FEMA’s beleaguered National 
Flood Insurance Program is currently $25 billion in the red. 
Fortunately, perhaps more than any other aspect of environmental policy 
today, protecting the natural areas required to maintain functional 
biodiversity – including providing funding for these protections – often 
garners bipartisan support at the federal level. In August 2020, for example, 
President Trump and Republican legislators highlighted a new federal law 
providing full annual funding for the Land and Water Conservation Fund, 
plus creation of the National Parks and Public Land Legacy Restoration Fund 
– a pot of money that will provide up to $1.9 billion annually for five years to 
cover priority deferred maintenance projects in national parks, national 
wildlife refuges, national forests, and on land administered by the Bureau of 
Land Management. The new law, known as the Great American Outdoors 
Act, was actually the culmination of many years of effort by both Democratic 
and Republican lawmakers, and will allow both state and federal land 
managers to better protect biodiversity and will provide facilities for visitors 
to enjoy public lands and the wildlife those lands support.  
Congress should sustain the momentum of this recent bipartisan effort to 
protect and restore biodiversity, as well as the infrastructure to enable 
people to sustainably enjoy this vital resource, by creating additional legal 
mechanisms to fund similar efforts. Strategic investment in protecting and 
restoring biodiversity now will pay dividends many times over during the 
lifetimes of our children and grandchildren.  
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Recommendations 
Congress should create a new series of Biodiversity Resilience Funds to 
promote restoration of biodiversity on federal and non-federal lands alike. 
These funds should include the following: 
Biodiversity Climate Resilience Fund: Most economists agree that putting 
a price on carbon emissions, in the form of a carbon tax or cap and trade 
scheme, is the most effective and economically efficient way to force 
polluters to internalize the costs of carbon pollution and reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. Many jurisdictions – including a growing number of countries 
and the state of California – already have such schemes in place. When 
creating such a framework at the federal level, Congress should allocate 10 
percent of the proceeds to the Biodiversity Climate Resilience Fund. The 
Council on Environmental Quality, using criteria established in regulations 
and on advice from a national Board of Advisors made up of representatives 
from local, state, and tribal government, as well as scientists appointed by 
the National Academy of Sciences, should allocate these funds for programs 
and projects that protect and restore biodiversity and promote climate 
resilience. Such programs and projects may include those carried out by 
federal agencies, such as funding recovery plans for endangered and 
threatened species, grants to state and local governments for “green 
infrastructure,” and funding for new and existing programs to fight climate 
change such as compensating farmers for changing cultivation methods to 
better sequester carbon. 
Federal Debt-for-Biodiversity Swaps: Congress should use its authority to 
restructure federal financial instruments to foster biodiversity restoration. 
For example, debt-for-biodiversity swaps would allow a federal agency such 
as BPA to receive financial credit from the U.S. Treasury for the value of steps 
the agency takes to protect biodiversity. Similarly, FEMA could retire its $25 
billion debt for the National Flood Insurance Program by buying out flooded 
properties rather than paying to rebuild them again and again.  
Biodiversity Restoration Fund: Congress should amend federal law to 
provide that the 50 percent of energy development revenues not allocated 
by the Great American Outdoors Act should go into the Biodiversity 
Restoration Fund. The Department of Interior should allocate proceeds from 
this fund to replace funds allocated to the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund lost due to our proposed ban on new offshore fossil fuel leasing that 
Congress should also immediately enact (see p. 5).  
Urban Tree Canopy Protection and Restoration Fund: Congress should 
immediately enact a small national excise tax on timber from both public 
and private lands, the proceeds of which should be allocated by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development to a fund providing grants 
to cities and municipalities to protect urban tree cover and urban wetlands. 
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Proposed Policy: Legislate Portions of the National Forest 
Planning Rules to Ensure Sustainability 
By Sandra B. Zellmer 
Background and Context 
In June 2020, Secretary of Agriculture Sonny Perdue announced a blueprint 
to “modernize” the U.S. Forest Service. In touting the benefits of his 
blueprint, Perdue said, “I’m from Georgia where we see 
trees as a crop, and it’s a longer term crop, but it’s a 
productive renewable resource, and guess what, it also 
has the ability to take carbon out of the air.” Perdue 
also remarked, “As stewards of the land it’s our moral 
obligation to leave it better than we found it, and … we 
can do that through active management.” 
Secretary Perdue appears to envision management as a 
streamlined, siloed exercise. He concluded his speech 
by promising to reduce rules that “complicate” forest 
management. “We want to expedite environmental 
reviews to support active management to protect 
communities, businesses, watershed and wildlife 
habitat.”  
Expediting review is precisely the wrong way to go.  
In 1976, when Congress passed the National Forest Management Act 
(NFMA), it embraced a number of recommendations from a blue ribbon 
committee of scientists that had been convened for the purpose of 
reforming unsustainable practices on our National Forest System lands. 
NFMA was pathbreaking legislation at the time. No longer would forests be 
managed as monoculture commodity crops; no longer would the extraction 
of minerals, oil, and gas be undertaken with no regard for ecological 
consequences or the needs of future generations; no longer would decisions 
be made behind closed doors without meaningful public input and scientific 
analysis.  
NFMA includes several key provisions relevant to healthy watersheds, 
ecological integrity, and climate sustainability. The focus on watersheds and 
forest protection goes all the way back to the Organic Act of 1897, and forest 
management has been guided by a congressionally mandated sustainability 
principle since 1960. But NFMA added an essential tool for accomplishing 
these purposes: land and resource management plans (Forest Plans). These 
Forest Plans go hand in hand with environmental review under NEPA. In fact, 
NFMA tracks closely with NEPA, which requires federal agencies to “[u]tilize a 
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of 
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the natural and social sciences … in planning and in decision-making which 
may have an impact on man's environment,” and to “[i]nitiate and utilize 
ecological information in the planning and development of resource-
oriented projects.”  
With NEPA analysis lighting the way, NFMA requires the development of 
forest plans every 15 years or so. At present, many national forest units are 
undergoing revisions, providing the public with a golden opportunity to 
influence forest management for years, and even decades, to come. 
Contrary to Secretary Perdue's visions, forests are not to be managed as 
“tree farms”; rather, under NFMA, forest plans permit logging only where it is 
physically suitable for watershed conditions, soils, and slopes. NFMA also 
utilizes forest planning to ensure that aquatic resources and the diversity of 
plant and animal communities are ensured.  
As for climate, NFMA mandates the Forest Service account for the effects of 
climate change when assessing the status of forests, rangelands, and other 
renewable resources under its jurisdiction and when developing 
recommendations for resource management. The Forest Service’s 2011 
National Roadmap for Responding to Climate Change recognized that 
maintaining diverse, functioning forest and grasslands is critical in dealing 
with the variable and uncertain and impacts of climate change. “While 
systems are certain to change, having a greater array of ecosystems and 
species reduces our vulnerability to the impacts of a changing climate.” 
According to the Roadmap:  
A primary purpose for reserving Federal forest land at the turn of the 20th 
century was to protect watersheds. Today, roughly one out of five Americans 
depends on a national forest for drinking water. The quantity and quality of 
America’s water, however, are affected by a changing climate. Rising air 
temperatures mean less snow, along with faster and earlier snowmelts. 
Greater variability in the volume and timing of precipitation means more 
floods and droughts. Warmer water … alters critical fish habitat, while 
increased evapotranspiration leads to drier vegetation and more fire, insects, 
and pathogens.  
The Roadmap acknowledged that forests “play an increasingly vital role in 
protecting the Nation’s watersheds … [as they] reduce erosion, recharge 
aquifers, regulate stream flows, moderate water temperatures, and protect 
water quality.” Sustainably managed forests provide carbon sequestration 
and biomass energy as well.  
Although NFMA includes fairly sophisticated sustainability requirements, it 
still leaves a great deal to political influence and agency discretion.86 To 
cabin that discretion, the planning regulations required by NFMA § 1604(g) 
help solidify the statutory requirements with binding standards. The most 
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recent planning regulations were issued by the Obama Administration in 
2012 after years of proposed revisions, many rounds of public comment, and 
litigation. It took more than a decade to revise the previous version of the 
regulations, which took effect in 1982. Proposed revisions were launched by 
the Clinton Administration in 1999, but they were retracted and reworked by 
the Bush Administration in 2005. The current regulations were revised and 
issued in final form in 2012.  
The politicization of the planning regulations has generated a great deal of 
uncertainty and skepticism. Planning has fallen badly behind schedule. As of 
2012, of the nation’s 130 forest plans, more than half (68) were past due for 
revision. To date, only a handful of revisions have been completed under the 
2012 planning rule.87 From catastrophic wildfires to other forms of habitat 
loss, experts agree that “chronic delay hampers effective resource 
management.”88 Our National Forest System is too important to let languish. 
Congress should kickstart the sputtering effort to modernize forest 
planning. 
Recommendations 
To fulfill NFMA’s sustainability goal and to minimize the uncertainty and 
political maneuvering that takes place through changes in short-term 
administrative priorities, we recommend that several of the provisions of the 
2012 Planning Rule be legislatively mandated. Congress should amend 
NFMA’s planning provisions to require forest plans to include the following 
components:  
• Include standards to maintain and restore ecosystem integrity and 
diversity of ecosystems and habitat types throughout the planning area, 
including components to maintain or restore structure, function, 
composition, and connectivity, taking into account conditions in the 
broader landscape that may influence sustainability within the plan area, 
as well as system drivers, including dominant processes, disturbance 
regimes, and stressors, such as natural succession, wildland fire, invasive 
species, and climate change.  
• Provide ecological conditions necessary to keep common native species 
common, contribute to recovery of threatened and endangered species, 
conserve proposed and candidate species, and maintain viable 
populations of species of conservation concern and of focal species. 
Species of conservation concern “occur in the plan area and ... the best 
available scientific information indicates substantial concern about the 
species' capability to persist over the long-term in the plan area.” Viable 
populations persist over the long term with sufficient distribution to be 
resilient and adaptable to stressors and likely future environments.  
• Select and monitor focal species on the basis of their functional role in 
ecosystems in order to evaluate the status and trends of overall diversity 
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and to assess ecological conditions. Focal species serve keystone 
functions as engineers of ecological processes or in food web dynamics.  
• Adapt management strategies and plans through revisions or 
amendments as necessary to respond to new information.  
• Ensure consistency of every project and decision with the plan.  
• Require meaningful analysis of environmental impacts and alternatives 
for plan revisions, amendments, and all other major federal actions on 
National Forest System lands pursuant to the 1978 CEQ regulations (for 
example, ensure that adoption and revision of every forest plan is 
accompanied by an EIS). Authorize categorical exclusions only for those 
minor actions that are known to have insignificant environmental effects, 
individually and cumulatively.  
In addition, with respect to the effects of climate change, Congress should 
spur the Forest Service to stay on top of best practices of modeling and 
adopting adaptation strategies. NFMA should be amended to incorporate 
climate-smart components of the Forest Service’s 2011 National Roadmap 
for Responding to Climate Change and related regulations: 
• Forest plans must recognize that maintaining diverse, functioning forest 
and grasslands is critical in dealing with the variable and uncertain 
impacts of climate change.  
• Forest plans must include requirements to monitor, assess, and manage 
forest resources and to apply these steps to ongoing, near term, and 
longer term activities and decision points in order to implement a 
comprehensive, science-based approach for managing forests and 
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Climate Justice and the Climate Crisis 
By Shalanda H. Baker, Alice Kaswan, Sarah Krakoff, and Hannah J. Wiseman  
Summary 
Climate change has disproportionate negative impacts on Black, Indigenous, 
people of color (BIPOC) and low-income populations throughout the United 
States. Pre-existing structural inequalities in housing, health care, 
infrastructure, and access to capital make these communities doubly 
vulnerable. First, BIPOC and low-income communities suffer more from the 
effects of climate change. Many studies and reports document that negative 
effects from increased temperatures, rising sea levels, prolonged drought 
cycles, and more intense storms and heat waves track racial and class 
divides. Second, BIPOC and low-income communities are more vulnerable to 
the economic disruption caused by the rapid transition 
to zero-carbon sources of energy.  
Federal leadership can have a significant 
impact on how climate mitigation and 
adaptation policies affect BIPOC and low-
income communities. On the mitigation 
side, first, the federal government should 
adopt a robust strategy to ensure that the 
transition to zero-carbon energy sources protects 
workers and local economies that have been dependent on 
fossil fuels. Second, the federal government should adopt policies to address 
longstanding issues of unequal access to energy and electricity. Third, the 
federal government should use the energy transition as an opportunity to 
reduce both carbon and the pollutants undermining public health in 
frontline communities. With regard to adaptation, the federal government 
should channel funding and resources directly to frontline and vulnerable 
communities.  
Recommendation #1: Congress and the president should address the 
negative impacts of the rapid shift to a zero-carbon economy on formerly 
fossil fuel-dependent communities by enacting Just Transition legislation. 
The legislation should prioritize BIPOC and low-income communities, and 
include funding for planning processes, worker and community support, 
and data collection.  
Recommendation #2: Congress and the president should enact legislation 
that prioritizes distributed clean energy investments in BIPOC and 
environmental justice communities, lowers the energy burden on BIPOC and 
low-income communities, and increases opportunities for ownership of 
clean energy assets in frontline communities. 
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Recommendation #3: Congress and the president should adopt climate 
mitigation policies that simultaneously reduce other forms of pollution (co-
pollutants) that adversely impact BIPOC and low-income communities.  
Recommendation #4: Congress and the president should provide federal 
support and establish climate adaptation parameters to achieve adaptation 
justice for BIPOC and low-income communities.  
Proposed Policy: Federal Just Transitions Legislation and 
Policies 
By Sarah Krakoff and Hannah J. Wiseman  
Background  
To prevent further dangerous effects from climate change, the economy 
must rapidly transition away from carbon-based sources of energy and 
consumer goods. The largest source of U.S. carbon emissions is the 
transportation sector, representing 36 percent of emissions.89 Electrification 
of a substantial portion of the vehicle fleet will therefore be 
a necessary component of U.S. climate policy. Close 
behind the transportation sector, at 35 percent of U.S. 
emissions is power generation, requiring a move away 
from fossil fuel-fired power plants toward renewable 
sources of energy and greater energy efficiency. 
These changes will have major benefits, including job 
creation, pollution reduction, the formation of more 
durable and sustainable industries, and the ability to 
create opportunities for groups that have previously 
been underrepresented in economic growth. But if 
inadequately addressed through public policy, the 
transition will also produce costs in the form of job 
losses, fewer revenue dollars for governments and 
communities previously dependent on fossil fuels, and a 
measure of social and economic disruption. These 
changes will disproportionately affect BIPOC and low-income 
communities; indeed, examples of economic disruption are already evident 
in formerly fossil-fuel dependent communities across the country, including 
in the Navajo Nation, the Powder River Basin (including the Crow Indian 
Tribe), and in West Virginia.  
Recommendations 
Federal Just Transitions Legislation. The federal government should adopt 
legislation that provides funding, resources, and data collection for 
communities and individuals most vulnerable to the transition away from 
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fossil fuels. The legislation should prioritize resources for BIPOC and low-
income communities that historically have borne the brunt of negative 
impacts from fossil fuel extraction, production, and distribution. A federal 
Just Transitions policy could be modeled in part after the Base Realignment 
and Closure process, which establishes a commission to set priorities for 
base closures and provides community involvement and access to transition 
funding.90 
Funding for Community Vision and Planning Processes. Just Transitions 
legislation should include grants to communities heavily impacted by and 
dependent on fossil-fuel development to allow them to engage in planning 
processes to determine their economic futures. Community planning has 
already been used to good effect in some former coal-dependent 
communities, but federal funding and leadership are necessary to match the 
scale of the transition ahead.91  
Funding for Community Economic Growth, Services, and Infrastructure. 
Just Transitions legislation should include grants that support the initiatives 
identified in communities’ vision and planning processes, including seed 
funding for start-ups and similar initiatives geared toward economic 
innovation and reinvention; money for critical investment in new 
infrastructure and repair of existing infrastructure; and support for essential 
community services such as public health offices, schools, and fire and 
emergency services during the transition away from fossil fuels.  
Funding for Individual Workers Losing Jobs. Workers who lose jobs due to 
the decline of fossil fuel development and distribution will need various 
forms of support. For those near retirement, pension and health care 
support will be required. Workers who remain in the labor force will need 
unemployment compensation, job retraining, health care, and relocation 
support. In one example of this type of policy tool, New Mexico’s Energy 
Transition Act creates a Displaced Workers Assistance Fund, which provides 
financial support for job retraining and the costs of participating in 
apprenticeship programs, among other provisions.92 Alberta, Canada’s Coal 
and Electricity Transition Tuition Voucher provides workers with up to 
CA$12,000 for post-secondary education.93 In North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Germany—a region previously largely dependent on coal mining—Germany 
built a large university campus to help train workers and stimulate new 
economic development.94 Federal lawmakers should draw on these and 
other examples in designing worker support programs in Just Transitions 
legislation.  
Data collection and dissemination. Decisionmakers will need information 
about which individuals, groups, and communities are harmed and 
benefited by the transition, and the nature and degree of the harms and 
benefits. They will also require data on the stakeholders most in need of 
benefits that will flow from the transition—including those who have 
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historically experienced disproportionate burdens such as pollution from 
power plants or underrepresentation or inadequate pay in the workforce. 
Data collection should not be used as an excuse to delay the deployment of 
essential policy tools, but should be an expeditious front-end and 
continuing process to identify and prioritize workers and communities 
eligible for Just Transitions funding and support. Congress should fund and 
help coordinate this data collection effort, ensuring that communities, 
states, and non-governmental groups that participate in this effort use 
similar metrics and share results through a centralized, uniform database or 
similar platform.  
Proposed Policy: Federal Support for Energy Justice  
By Shalanda H. Baker  
Background  
BIPOC communities disproportionately bear the twin burdens of 
environmental injustice and energy insecurity. People of color are more 
likely to live near fossil-fuel generation, and BIPOC households are also more 
likely than white households to experience high energy burdens and energy 
insecurity. Although state and federal incentives have increased the 
penetration of rooftop solar around the country, recent studies show that 
communities of color have been left out of the solar energy transition. Even 
when controlling for income and home ownership, communities of color are 
less likely to have distributed solar energy than white communities.95 If 
utility electricity prices increase, communities of color would therefore be 
more likely to bear the cost. Federal policies should aim to address the 
environmental and energy burdens facing BIPOC communities, while also 
closing the gaps in clean energy access across racial groups.  
Recommendations 
Prioritize local clean energy investments in BIPOC communities and 
environmental justice communities. Distributed energy should form a 
cornerstone of the energy transition. Energy efficiency and distributed clean 
energy generation in the form of rooftop solar or community-owned solar 
can reduce the need to rely on harmful fossil-fuel generation and offer 
economic benefits that reduce energy burden and increase energy security. 
Federally supported distributed energy legislation should remedy the racial 
disparities in rooftop solar adoption by providing targeted funding to 
support solar investments in communities of color as well as frontline 
environmental justice communities. Legislation should offer incentives for 
solar developers to deploy rooftop solar projects in the target communities, 
and offer a pathway for target communities to own distributed energy. 
Federal funding should also support the identification and retrofitting of 
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energy-inefficient housing, and construction of new state-of-the-art housing 
and infrastructure in BIPOC and low-income communities. 
Decrease energy burden in BIPOC communities and low-income 
communities. Energy burden can dictate whether a family eats or keeps the 
lights on. Separate studies by the Energy Information Administration and 
the American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy reveal that low-
income and BIPOC communities in the United States suffer 
from extraordinary energy insecurity and energy 
burden.96 These communities routinely pay more than 
the recommended 6 percent of overall household 
income to meet energy needs, and their expenditures 
are often double or even three-and-a-half times higher 
than the median national energy burden of 3.1 
percent.97 In the face of high energy burden, the same 
communities face difficult choices as they struggle to 
meet basic household needs. In addition to investing in 
energy efficiency and distributed solar to reduce utility 
bills, federal energy policy should reduce the risk of 
excessive energy burdens by setting a ceiling on the 
percentage low-income communities must pay. The cap 
would free up household income that could help with 
wealth creation in BIPOC communities as well as local 
community investment. 
Accelerate opportunities for ownership of local clean energy assets in 
BIPOC communities and communities of color. Renewable energy 
development provides a critical pathway for deep decarbonization, but 
research shows that deployment of large-scale clean energy can have 
disproportionate social and environmental impacts on BIPOC communities, 
replicating the inequities of fossil-fuel based development.98 Renewable 
energy deployment must incorporate community economic participation as 
well as political participation. These levels of participation will offer 
economic benefits to frontline communities and enhance overall 
community buy-in of renewable projects. Federal energy policy should 
require utility-scale renewable energy developers to include communities as 
co-beneficiaries of large renewable projects and include incentives for 
communities to develop community-owned utility-scale clean energy 
projects. Community benefits should include a requirement for equity 
(economic) participation in large-scale project development. This will 
enhance the overall economic benefits for low-income, frontline, and BIPOC 
communities. 
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Proposed Policy: Adopt Climate Policies that Provide Co-
Pollutant Benefits 
By Alice Kaswan 
Background 
The inequalities in policing highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement 
are only one among many inequalities experienced by BIPOC communities 
across the country. Decades of evidence demonstrates that environmental 
harms, including air pollution, are disproportionately located in frontline and 
vulnerable communities, a consequence of our history of segregation, 
zoning laws, and political and economic exclusion.99  
While greenhouse gases themselves do not have significant localized 
impacts, most emission sources emit locally harmful co-pollutants alongside 
greenhouse gases. Congress’s first priority among a range of climate options 
should be strategies that achieve the most benefits, including public health 
benefits. Similarly, Congress should avoid or de-prioritize strategies with 
negative public health consequences. 
Recommendations 
Use carbon pricing as a backstop and revenue-generator, not as a first-
order strategy. Many BIPOC communities have raised significant concerns 
about carbon pricing strategies. In addition to skepticism about their 
efficacy in sparking fundamental change, community 
activists argue that, because market mechanisms leave 
emissions decisions to industry, individual facilities and 
companies can maintain or increase emissions, so long as 
they are willing to pay. Consequently, pricing mechanisms 
could perpetuate or worsen pollution in frontline 
communities, depriving them of the public health co-
benefits they would have obtained if these facilities had 
decreased their GHG emissions.  
At the same time, carbon pricing has certain virtues. The 
cap in a cap-and-trade program or the tax rate in a carbon 
tax can provide a steady emission reduction incentive—
and backstop—if more direct policies have gaps and are 
implemented too slowly. Moreover, by requiring polluters 
to pay, carbon pricing programs create a revenue stream 
that can help finance an equitable clean energy transition.  
The backbone of U.S. climate strategies should be a vision for 
a clean and equitable transition coupled with intentionally designed climate 
strategies that maximize public health and welfare benefits. Carbon pricing 
should complement more direct strategies rather than the other way 
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around. Direct requirements and programs to reduce industrial and mobile 
source emissions could reduce pollution hot spots and reduce emissions 
broadly. If carbon pricing is implemented in addition to, rather than instead 
of, more targeted pollution-reducing strategies, carbon pricing will not 
undermine opportunities to improve public health.  
Prioritize reductions in industries causing the most pollution. Congress 
should direct relevant federal and state agencies to design climate strategies 
that address the longstanding public health threats experienced in frontline 
communities. For industry, policymakers could prioritize achieving 
greenhouse gas reductions from the industries with the highest co-pollutant 
intensity, that is, those that generate the most pollution per unit of carbon. 
Policymakers could also prioritize greenhouse gas and associated co-
pollutant reductions from the industries causing the greatest public health 
risks due to their location in dense and vulnerable population centers. For 
example, in California and elsewhere, refineries are disproportionately 
located in low-income communities of color. Federal requirements that 
states develop climate strategies to reduce industry emissions where they 
would reap the greatest co-pollutant benefits could accomplish this goal. To 
avoid undue disruption and potential cross-border emissions leakage, the 
affected industries may require support, either directly or in the form of 
border adjustments.  
Avoid climate strategies that could cause more pollution. Policymakers 
should give a lower priority to carbon reduction strategies that increase 
harmful co-pollutants. For example, although biofuels are considered lower-
carbon than fossil fuels because plant material absorbs carbon prior to 
combustion (creating a neutral carbon cycle), burning biofuels can create 
harmful co-pollutants. Locating biofuel facilities in or near frontline 
communities, where they would contribute to greater pollution for 
residents, would intensify their adverse impacts. In addition, carbon capture 
and sequestration (CCS) mechanisms, which capture carbon from fossil fuel 
combustion and then transport the carbon for long-term storage, could, 
according to some studies, increase co-pollutant air and water emissions, in 
part because CCS is itself energy-intensive.100  
Eliminate or substantially reduce diesel pollution. Because diesel 
emissions present particularly significant climate and public health threats, 
policymakers should prioritize research and controls to eliminate them.101 
Diesel emissions generate “black carbon,” essentially particulate matter that 
exacerbates global warming by absorbing heat, whether airborne or 
deposited. In addition, diesel particulates present high risks to public health. 
In a 1998 study, California’s health assessment agency estimated that diesel 
exhaust causes 70 percent of cancer risk from air toxics in the state.102 
Children riding diesel school buses, and frontline communities living close 
to ports, highways, and warehouse districts are likely to experience 
disproportionate exposure to diesel pollution.  
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Requiring manufacturers to sell zero-emission trucks and equipment would 
spur technological innovation and the supply of zero-emission options. 
Requiring owners of bus and truck fleets, shipyards, and farms to utilize zero 
emission trucks and equipment would spur demand. Funds for research and 
development, as well as subsidies for manufacturers and equipment 
purchasers, may be necessary to avoid excessive disruption in these sectors.  
Target transportation improvements to frontline communities. 
Emissions from passenger vehicles, trucks, and buses are a major source of 
both carbon and traditional pollutants. Targeting transportation resources 
to frontline communities is the only way to spread the benefits of transit, 
sustainable development, and zero-emission vehicles to communities and 
individuals that would otherwise be unable to afford them. Because many of 
these communities suffer from disproportionate levels of air pollution, 
targeting public transportation and zero-emission resources in these 
communities would also provide out-sized public health benefits. 
Proposed Policy: Provide Federal Support and Adaptation 
Parameters to Achieve Adaptation Justice 
By Alice Kaswan 
Background and Context  
Climate change is already here, causing more frequent and intense floods, 
fires, extreme heat, and other impacts. As much as we work to reduce 
emissions, we will simultaneously have to adapt to the changes human-
induced climate change has already wrought. Adaptation will not be the 
same for everyone.103 Vulnerability to climate change is strongly correlated 
with race, class, age, and other demographic factors. Three variables shape 
the full experience: physical exposure, sensitivity to harm, and the capacity 
to cope. Low-income populations and people of color face particular 
challenges under all of these factors.  
Although the wealthy may disproportionately face particular risks, like 
coastal erosion affecting beach houses, for example, socioeconomically 
challenged communities are likely to face greater physical exposure in many 
contexts, including living on lower-valued land at risk of flooding or in a 
dense urban setting subject to the heat-island effect, as well as working in 
exposed occupations like agriculture and construction. Socioeconomic 
factors can also affect sensitivity to harm, which is determined by underlying 
health conditions (themselves shaped by access to healthy food and health 
care), housing conditions, access to air conditioning and the money to pay 
for it, and the like. Lastly, the capacity to cope in the long-term is critical, a 
factor shaped by savings, home insurance, access to government benefits, 
and geographic mobility.  
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For indigenous populations, including Alaska Natives and Tribes throughout 
the continental United States, climate change impacts present existential 
threats to entire cultures. Native American identity and culture are uniquely 
tied to place, and as climate change eats away at the land, whether through 
coastal flooding or unsustainable drought, community life and cultural 
integrity are threatened. Tribal governments are also at risk, and adaptation 
planning must include respect for tribal sovereignty and self-determination. 
Climate change will also cause hidden and indirect impacts. Analysts 
estimate that, by 2100, as many as 13 million people could be directly 
impacted by sea-level rise alone, and could, potentially, migrate in 
response.104 In the long-term, as people migrate away from areas most 
impacted by climate change (in the United States and 
elsewhere), “receiving communities” will accommodate 
in-migration. Communities that might not perceive 
current climate risks need to be prepared for future 
impacts on housing availability and affordability, 
increased infrastructure needs, and all of the other 
consequences, positive and potentially negative, of an 
expanding population. 
Effective adaptation will require advance planning rather 
than reactive and piecemeal decision-making. 
Opportunities for meaningful participation, including people 
who have been historically marginalized, will be critical. 
Although most adaptation decisions will be made at the state and local 
levels where impacts are immediately experienced, federal law can 
nonetheless play a significant role. Federal funding will be essential to help 
state and local governments prepare and respond. And as the federal 
government provides funding, it can establish planning parameters and 
conditions that help achieve adaptation justice.  
Recommendations 
Continue to fund federal research on climate impacts, with explicit 
attention to impacts on the nation’s most vulnerable populations. In 
addition to considering those directly impacted, the federal government 
should begin research on potential migration pathways and potential 
impacts on receiving communities, with explicit attention to the most 
vulnerable migrants and receiving communities. 
Maintain a federal adaptation clearinghouse for addressing climate 
risks, and, within that clearinghouse, highlight strategies for addressing 
risks to the most vulnerable populations. In addition, the federal 
government should adopt an affirmative program to disseminate 
information to states, local governments, and non-profit organizations and 
help support their implementation efforts. 
Effective adaptation will require 
advance planning rather than 
reactive and piecemeal decision-
making. Opportunities for 
meaningful participation, 
including people who have been 
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Require local adaptation planning, integrated with state and local 
hazard mitigation planning. The planning requirements should:  
• Explicitly require assessment of demographics and particular 
vulnerabilities in differing populations, including such factors as access 
to air-conditioning, transportation options, need for shelter in the event 
of evacuation, and other factors relevant to local climate risks. 
• Require development of a participation plan that includes mechanisms 
to ensure the meaningful engagement of frontline communities in light 
of local demographics and communication modes, including 
interpretation and outreach through non-governmental entities. 
Establish parameters for how communities facing climate risks choose 
among their three central response options: (1) protection from climate 
impacts (e.g., flood gates; new water supply sources); (2) increased resiliency 
(e.g., housing code updates, like elevation requirements); and (3) retreat. 
Retreat may be the only option for areas at great risk, but other options are 
possible in some contexts. Parameters include: 
For Native American Tribes and indigenous communities, robust 
consultation and free, prior, informed consent before any decision to 
retreat. Where retreat is the only option, allow for tribally driven decisions 
about relocation sites and provide support for maintaining tribal self-
governance throughout the process.  
• To the degree the federal government provides funding for “managed 
retreat,” including buy-outs to help those who are most in harm’s way, 
federal funding should include parameters that reduce the potential for 
buy-out abuse.  
• Where there are alternatives to retreat, the federal government should 
require a showing that buy-out decisions are not driven solely by land 
value (disadvantaging poorer neighborhoods) and that buy-outs of low-
income and of-color communities are justified by unacceptable risk and 
not being used as indirect exclusionary tools.  
Prioritize federal adaptation funding for Tribes, communities and 
households with the greatest need, including both sending and 
receiving communities. For example, hazard mitigation funding should go 
to lower-income communities and households, and funding to support 
affordable housing should be provided to receiving communities. 
Conclusion  
Climate change is affecting communities throughout the nation right now. 
Fires raging in the west and storms repeatedly battering the gulf coast are 
2020's climate tragedies. Others are in motion or soon to come, including 
long-term drought, rising sea levels, and extreme heat events. The energy 
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transition is also already under way, though it is not happening as rapidly as 
it must. Federal lawmakers should seize on this pivotal moment to address 
climate change and also redress longstanding inequality and injustice for 
BIPOC and low-income communities. Just transitions legislation, energy 
justice legislation, and policies for mitigation and adaptation that prioritize 
frontline and vulnerable communities would go a long way toward ensuring 
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Governance Mechanisms and the Climate Crisis 
By Daniel Farber, Victor Flatt, Alice Kaswan, Joel A. Mintz, and Joseph Tomain 
Summary  
Congress and federal agencies implementing climate legislation will face a 
wide range of policy choices as they seek the best set of strategies to reduce 
emissions. No single strategy alone will solve the crisis. Congress should 
consider climate-related governance mechanisms that cut across existing 
regulatory programs, develop climate-specific regulations, and strengthen 
basic agency functions. In this paper, Center for Progressive Reform (CPR) 
Member Scholars offer their expertise on a few key mechanisms. 
Recommendation 1: Research and Development. To build technological 
capacity to achieve decarbonization, robust 
federal funding for research and development 
is essential. While the private sector 
continues research and investment in 
alternative energy and efficiency 
technologies, federal support will enable 
continued innovation in promising 
options that remain too speculative for 
private investment. 
Recommendation 2: Social Cost of Carbon. On the regulatory side, 
Congress faces a plethora of choices. A scientifically defensible financial 
estimate of climate impacts, the “social cost of carbon” is key to integrating 
potential climate impacts into regulatory decisions across the federal 
government. The social cost of carbon could also provide a reference point if 
Congress decides to establish a carbon tax or other pricing mechanism. 
Recommendation 3: Carbon Pricing Options. The role of carbon pricing in 
federal climate legislation is itself a critical question. We present several 
factors that are critical to the choice between two common carbon pricing 
mechanisms: a carbon tax, like those seen in recent congressional bills, and 
cap-and-trade, the form adopted by a number of states.  
Recommendation 4: The Limited Role of Carbon Pricing. Although a 
carbon price has a role to play, Congress should develop a more 
comprehensive and visionary decarbonization strategy that includes but is 
not limited to carbon pricing. 
Recommendation 5: Strong Enforcement Mechanisms. Climate mitigation 
strategies will only work if they are effectively implemented and enforced. 
Congress should ensure that EPA’s enforcement resources and substantive 
enforcement policies will lead to widespread compliance and real progress 
on the path to decarbonization. 
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Proposed Policy: Federal Funding for Clean Energy 
Research & Development 
By Joseph Tomain 
Background 
Clean energy research and development (R&D) is consistent with past 
government investments such as the Manhattan Project, Project Apollo and, 
now, finding a COVID-19 vaccine. At the same time, it also has distinct 
characteristics. Clean energy research does not have a specific target. There 
is no silver bullet that will help us transition from a dirty fossil fuel energy 
economy to a clean one. Instead, clean energy R&D requires a full-scale 
partnership between the federal government and the private sector, with 
each sector playing a specific role in furtherance of one goal – the marketing 
and commercialization of new technologies.  
R&D investments occur along a continuum from basic science and 
technology through marketing and commercialization. At the basic science 
and technology stage, government is heavily, and most often exclusively, 
involved because the private sector does not want to take on the financial 
risk of failure. Similarly, government finances the demonstration projects 
needed to take a concept off the drawing boards and into the world. After 
demonstration, private sector corporations take over the marketing and 
commercialization of new technologies, and they reap the financial rewards. 
Most R&D is performed by the Department of Energy, which oversees its 
own R&D programs, as well as 17 national laboratories that are dispersed 
throughout the United States. Historically, most of the research conducted 
by these laboratories was for defense purposes. Today, defense is still the 
primary focus for many of these labs; however, energy innovation is 
attracting increased government funding. 
The key DOE R&D arm is the Advanced Research Projects Agency – Energy 
(ARPA-E), which, since its inception, has provided approximately $2.3 billion 
in R&D funding for more than 800 potentially transformational energy 
technology projects. ARPA-E has funded small businesses, universities, large 
corporations, and federal research and development centers, as well as 
nonprofit organizations.  
ARPA-E operates two significant initiatives. Energy Innovation Hubs bring 
together top scientists and engineers from the academy, industry, and 
government to overcome known barriers to technological innovation and to 
reduce the time from laboratory innovation to technological development 
then to commercialization. By way of example, the Joint Center for Energy 
Storage Research (JCESR) is dedicated to improving energy storage with the 
goal of having 25 percent of all electricity consumed in the United States 
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generated by solar and wind by 2025. The United States also operates 46 
Energy Frontier Research Centers (EFRCs) that consist of partnerships among 
universities, national laboratories, nonprofit organizations, and for-profit 
firms. EFRCs have successfully funded research on solar panels, lithium 
batteries, LED lighting, wind turbines, smart grid technologies, appliances, 
transportation, carbon capture, and innovative nuclear energy 
technologies.105  
The private sector is eager for clean energy investments. Despite the COVID 
crisis, global investment in clean energy for the first half of 2020 increased 5 
percent, continuing a years-long trend. These investments are paying off. 
Renewable energy is producing more electric power than coal-fired power 
plants in 2020;106 the private sector is investing in nuclear fusion;107 solar 
and wind dominates new generation;108 and as renewable stocks 
outperform fossil fuels, financial advisors are recommending buy orders for 
renewables.109  
Despite private involvement in clean energy, additional 
federal R&D investments are needed to lay the 
groundwork for subsequent private development. More 
research is needed across many clean energy options, 
including local and utility-scale solar, on-shore and off-
shore wind, the smart grid, electric vehicles and their 
charging infrastructure, nuclear fusion, energy storage, 
large- and small-scale battery configurations, artificial 
intelligence, small modular nuclear units, bioenergy, and 
new materials. Research is needed not only on individual 
options, but on the synergies among energy 
technologies. Investments in the smart grid could, for 
example, synchronize with investments in artificial 
intelligence, electric vehicles, recharging stations, and affordable and lighter 
weight batteries.  
Recommendation 
Congress should continue to provide robust R&D funding. Government and 
private investors acknowledge the importance of clean energy and the 
reality of the transition. The Trump administration is notorious for its 
antipathy toward science and has proffered budget proposals to zero out 
ARPA-E. It is notable that Congress has resisted these budget proposals. 
Looking forward, Congress and future administrations should continue, if 
not increase, their support for ARPA-E. 
Renewable energy is producing 
more electric power than coal-
fired power plants in 2020; the 
private sector is investing in 
nuclear fusion; solar and wind 
dominates new generation; and 
as renewable stocks outperform 
fossil fuels, financial advisors are 
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Proposed Policy: Reevaluate the Social Cost of Carbon 
By Daniel Farber 
Background 
For the past 40 years, cost-benefit analysis has played a critical role in the 
process of issuing regulations. To be valid, that analysis must take climate 
change into account. Doing so requires estimating the social cost of carbon 
– the harm done by the emission of a single ton of carbon dioxide or the 
equivalent amount of another greenhouse gas such as methane.  
Estimates of the social cost of carbon are important for other reasons. They 
can benchmark the right level for a carbon tax or the price level in a carbon 
trading system. The social cost of carbon can also provide a way of 
communicating to policymakers and the public the benefits of cutting 
carbon emissions.  
In response to a federal court ruling requiring agencies to take in account 
the social cost of carbon, the Obama administration assembled an 
interagency working group to provide an estimate for use by all government 
agencies. The estimate was based on three leading economic models and 
was subjected to careful peer review. The resulting estimate was used 
throughout the government under Obama and also won recognition from 
state and foreign governments for its credibility. The Obama 
administration’s estimate was upheld by a federal appeals court.110 
President Trump rescinded this estimate. He ordered agencies to produce 
their own estimates and emphasized that they should follow normal 
guidelines that discourage inclusion of costs to foreign countries. The 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the EPA have since adopted the 
same estimates, which are around 85 percent below the Obama 
administration’s estimates. The Obama administration estimated that a ton 
of carbon emitted in 2020 caused $42 in damage, whereas the Trump 
administration’s estimate was $7. The difference is largely due to ignoring all 
harm U.S. emissions cause outside of our own borders, but the use of a 
higher discount rate (lowering the weight placed on future harm) was also 
significant. These changes were made without peer review.  
In a recent ruling, a federal district court found the Trump administration’s 
analysis to be “riddled with flaws.”111 As the court pointed out, BLM had 
simply ignored studies by economists supporting global damages and 
showing that estimates limited to individual regions such as the United 
States are unreliable. The court also pointed out that BLM had ignored the 
impacts of climate change on Americans living abroad and on U.S. trade. 
Thus, the administration had failed to give a reasoned argument for 
changing direction.  
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Recommendations 
Cost-benefit analysis has its critics, including a number of CPR Member 
Scholars. This is not the place to reprise that debate. As long as the 
government continues to use cost-benefit analysis, however, it should 
certainly include full consideration of the environmental benefits of 
regulation. We advocate no more than using the best available methods for 
doing so.  
In the short term, restore the Obama administration's estimate of the 
social cost of carbon. The Trump administration’s estimate rests on a flimsy 
scientific basis. It has chosen to ignore recommendations by the National 
Academies of Sciences112 for improving estimates of the social cost of 
carbon. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has warned that 
without paying heed to the NAS recommendations and current economics 
research, government estimates may be scientifically flawed.113 The GAO 
also found that the economic models that the Trump administration used 
“were not premised or calibrated to provide estimates of the social cost of 
carbon based on domestic damages.”  
Given the significant questions about the integrity of the science behind the 
Trump administration’s estimates, the Obama administration’s estimates 
should be reinstated across all agencies as an immediate interim measure. 
In the longer-term, update the social cost of carbon estimate. To prevent 
future backsliding, key requirements for the social cost of carbon should be 
enacted into law by Congress and incorporated into binding regulations by 
agencies like EPA. New rules for determining the social cost of carbon should 
adopt a precautionary approach, incorporating the four principles listed 
below.  
• Principle 1: Because climate change requires a global response, the 
social cost of carbon should be based on global impacts, not merely 
impacts within the boundaries of the United States. 
The Trump administration was wrong to limit the analysis to climate 
impacts within the United States. American interests are intertwined with 
the state of the rest of the world, a fact that was obvious even before the 
global pandemic. Moreover, limiting future climate impacts within the 
United States will require global cooperation. We cannot expect other 
nations to cooperate with us if we give their interests zero weight in our 
own climate policies. 
• Principle 2: To give appropriate weight to the interests of future 
generations, a low discount rate should be used in determining the 
social cost of carbon.  
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The incredibly long-lasting effects of carbon emissions will 
dramatically impact future generations. Using a high discount rate 
essentially ignores much of the devastation our actions will cause. 
When the Obama administration estimated the social cost of carbon 
associated with a range of potential discount rates, it came to only 
$12 per ton with a 5 percent discount rate, but increased by a factor 
of five with a 2.5 percent discount rate because lower discount rate 
gives much more weight to long-term harms.114 At the Obama 
administration’s preferred 3 percent discount rate, the social cost of 
carbon estimate is three-and-a-half times as high as with the 5 
percent level. In contrast, the Trump administration estimated the 
social cost of carbon using a 3 percent rate and a 7 percent rate, 
reducing the social cost of carbon to $1 per ton at the higher rate.  
• Principle 3: Because of uncertainties about the future extent of climate 
change and impacts on human society, the social cost of 
carbon should give substantial weight to the risk of 
catastrophic outcomes.  
Sound policy also requires giving weight to the very real 
possibility that climate change may be worse than 
expected. Scientists are confident of the reality of climate 
change and have made progress in estimating its future 
severity, but the possibility of much worse outcomes 
cannot be excluded. Such outcomes would have 
disastrous effects on society, and the social cost of 
carbon should take that risk into account.  
• Principle 4: The process for determining the social cost of carbon should 
involve peer review and use the best available economic modeling and 
data. 
Admittedly, any estimate of the social cost of carbon will be imprecise. 
But we can at least make our best effort to take climate impacts into 
account by requiring experts to review the analysis and by employing 
high-quality data and methods. The Trump administration has failed to 
observe these obvious requirements. We should ensure that the same 
mistakes are not made by future administrations. 
 
Sound policy also requires giving 
weight to the very real possibility 
that climate change may be worse 
than expected. Scientists are 
confident of the reality of climate 
change and have made progress in 
estimating its future severity, but 
the possibility of much worse 
outcomes cannot be excluded. 
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Proposed Policy: Parameters for Choosing and Designing a 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
By Victor Flatt 
Background 
According to the World Bank’s 2018 carbon pricing report, more than 70 
jurisdictions around the world, including China, have some form of national-
level direct carbon pricing, usually applying to all greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
with non-carbon GHGs converted into their carbon equivalents. Economists 
are virtually unanimous in their claims that carbon pricing is an efficient and 
important strategy for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. California 
already has an economy-wide carbon price (through a cap and trade 
system), the northeastern states have a cap and trade program applicable to 
the electricity sector, and other jurisdictions around the world with carbon 
pricing programs are planning on strengthening them by applying border 
adjustment taxes (BAT) on products which come from countries without 
similar mechanisms. All of this suggests that the United States will be under 
pressure to pursue some kind of federal carbon pricing mechanism in the 
near future.  
Policymakers can choose among many possible mechanisms for reducing 
greenhouse gases. Although not the only possible or even a preferred 
strategy, implementation of a direct carbon pricing strategy can 
complement and work in tandem with other policy solutions. (Alice Kaswan 
discusses the importance of non-pricing measures in her contribution to this 
paper.) 
One common type of carbon pricing is a direct Pigouvian tax on greenhouse 
gas emissions, usually imposed on major polluters and, potentially, on 
upstream sources of carbon, like oil and gas distributors. The other common 
pricing system is cap and trade, wherein the government sets a long-term 
target and then establishes decreasing emissions caps and auctions off or 
otherwise distributes emission allowances. Polluters can buy, trade, and sell 
their emissions allowances, so long as they hold sufficient allowances to 
cover their actual emissions. A cap and trade program’s carbon price is 
generated by the allowances’ market price.  
Carbon taxes and greenhouse gas cap and trade schemes can be set up to 
be roughly equivalent in terms of impact on emissions and money raised 
from the tax or sale of emissions rights. The choice between a carbon tax 
and a cap and trade system depends on many factors. Both can be used to 
generate revenue, and both can be used to curb emissions.  
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Recommendations 
In designing a program and choosing between a carbon tax and cap-and-
trade, Congress should address the following factors:  
Any federal carbon pricing system needs to be understandable and not 
too complex. Attempting to achieve multiple policy goals by controlling 
emissions distributions, developing complex offset provisions, and creating 
nuanced allowance allocation or tax rate provisions could increase 
complexity.  
Congress must address the tradeoff between certainty in carbon prices 
and certainty in achieving emissions reductions. Because taxes provide a 
transparent and, presumably, stable price, they provide the regulated sector 
with more certainty with respect to price of emissions. The more stable price 
also allows government to better predict likely revenue. However, taxes do 
not control overall emissions, leading to uncertainty in emissions levels.  
In contrast, by setting a clear cap, presumably descending over time, a well-
designed cap and trade system would provide more certainty as to 
emissions reductions. However, emissions prices will depend on demand, 
and so prices could be quite uncertain. 
The pricing scheme should be politically feasible. Though taxes were a 
dirty word the last time the United States took up the attempt to craft a 
greenhouse gas reduction law, taxes may be more politically feasible in the 
current political environment, particularly given the need for more federal 
revenue. 
Any pricing scheme should establish long-term parameters to increase 
predictability for business and to avoid future attempts for stakeholders 
to seek out individualized benefits that don’t benefit the program as a 
whole. Thus, the cap in a cap and trade system should be designed to 
decline on a predicted path of at least 20 years. Under a carbon tax, the 
increasing tax should be specified for at least 20 years. 
A new federal pricing scheme should account for existing domestic and 
international programs. That might suggest cap and trade over a carbon 
tax, as most of the existing programs in the rest of the world are in the form 
of cap and trade. Any two cap and trade systems can be linked with the 
agreement of the sovereigns, but there may also be accounting mechanisms 
that would allow a federal carbon tax to be compatible with existing global 
cap and trade programs. This might work by converting taxes paid into 
carbon dioxide equivalents based on a market price in a cap and trade 
system. However, this also increases complexity. 
Undoubtedly, the politics and optics of cap-and-trade and a carbon tax will 
also play a role in the choice between the two. Nonetheless, depending 
 
 
Climate, Energy, Justice         65 
upon design, cap-and-trade and a carbon tax could achieve equivalent 
greenhouse gas reductions. Whichever option Congress or the next 
administration chooses, they can amplify or ameliorate the advantages and 
disadvantages of these mechanisms by careful attention to the foregoing 
parameters.  
Proposed Policy: Carbon Pricing Should Not Supplant 
Visionary Strategies for Transitioning to a Clean Energy 
Economy 
By Alice Kaswan 
Background  
Congressional proposals, state initiatives, and environmental advocacy 
groups have recently featured carbon taxes, possibly with a dividend back to 
consumers, as an efficient greenhouse gas reduction strategy that would 
achieve climate goals at the lowest cost. Meanwhile, several 
states, including those participating in the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California, have already 
adopted some form of a cap-and-trade program, which 
sets an overall cap on emissions and then allows 
regulated entities to buy and sell allowances to cover 
their emissions. (In his contribution to this paper, Victor 
Flatt provides a sense of the parameters that could affect 
policymakers’ choice between a tax or cap-and-trade 
program.) A key question is: Considering the wide array of 
available climate mitigation strategies, what role should 
carbon pricing, in any form, play? 
Recommendation  
Although some form of carbon pricing is necessary to encourage reductions 
and create revenue, federal climate legislation should provide a more 
visionary roadmap for accomplishing a clean energy transition, with a 
carbon price complementing that vision. 
A carbon price relies on private actors to make carbon reduction decisions 
based on a price signal. This leads to fragmented and uncoordinated 
actions. Given the scale of our decarbonization challenge and its 
implications for our energy infrastructure, institutional structures for energy 
development and deployment, transportation, manufacturing, buildings, 
land use, and more, we need a coordinated strategy to accomplish a 
coherent, effective, and just transition. 
In addition, by relying on the piecemeal and short-term decisions of private 
actors to achieve reductions, a carbon price alone fails to provide a larger 
Although some form of carbon 
pricing is necessary to encourage 
reductions and create revenue, 
federal climate legislation should 
provide a more visionary 
roadmap for accomplishing a 
clean energy transition, with a 
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vision for a clean economy. A clean economy could take a variety of forms, 
all of which have important societal, environmental, and legal implications. 
Will we encourage decentralized electricity or maintain our centralized 
structure? How will we develop the transmission infrastructure needed to 
move renewable energy to population centers? When and how should we 
deploy alternatives to fossil fuels in the transportation sector? Who will 
benefit and who will be harmed? Will control shift from current owners to 
new entrepreneurs? What will this mean for our existing regulatory 
frameworks at the federal and state levels? Federal climate legislation should 
grapple with these central questions and, as appropriate, provide a 
framework for states to engage in thoughtful and inclusive planning. 
The lack of vision associated with a carbon price could also impede its 
political viability. Although industry might be attracted to what they 
perceive as a less expensive approach, a carbon price focuses on the cost 
side, not the benefit side, of a clean energy transition. A more 
comprehensive set of climate change strategies shows what can be 
achieved and how citizens, workers, industry, and agriculture can transition 
to a more sustainable future. Recent efforts to adopt carbon pricing in 
Washington State and Oregon failed,115 while more substantive and 
visionary policies have been enacted in states across the country, including 
Washington State, New York, New Mexico, Maine, Colorado, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and more.116 
Comprehensive strategies, at the federal, state, and local level, will also allow 
policymakers to identify measures that maximize overall benefits, including 
but not limited to greenhouse gas reduction benefits, and reduce potential 
costs. For example, strategies that simultaneously reduce co-pollutants in 
polluted areas will increase benefits, while strategies that might increase co-
pollutants in polluted areas, like some combustion of some biofuels, might 
impose environmental and public health costs. Planning can control for 
these effects; a carbon price would not.  
A carbon price also has implications for our democracy. By deferring to 
private sector decisions, carbon prices preclude democratic deliberation. 
Although a carbon price should be a part of any climate mitigation strategy, 
it should complement a more engaged and systematic reckoning with the 
future. 
Proposed Policy: Effective EPA Enforcement 
By Joel A. Mintz 
Background 
Without industry compliance, federal climate legislation will fail. Vigorous, 
fair, and even-handed EPA enforcement will be a critical element in assuring 
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such compliance. It is also needed to redress the unfair burdens that climate 
change places on low-wealth communities, including many communities of 
color. Unfortunately, over the past three-and-a-half years, EPA’s enforcement 
capability has been significantly diminished. To reinvigorate the agency’s 
flagging enforcement efforts and allow it to effectively enforce climate 
change legislation, climate legislation should ensure that the agency has 
adequate financial and staff resources and is armed with substantive 
provisions that will give it the tools it needs to make sure that everyone is 
following the laws on the books.  
Recommendations  
Resources: Enforcement Funding and Recruitment 
Increase EPA’s budget appropriations to enable full staffing. Due to 
budget cuts, low staff morale, and the retirement of a large cohort of “baby 
boomers,” EPA’s staff declined by 12.2 percent between 
December 2016 and December 2019 – a loss of 1,993 full-
time equivalent positions – with experienced senior staff 
overrepresented in those losses. The workforce of the 
agency’s Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance (OECA) was especially hard-hit, declining by 
15.7 percent during the first 20 months of the Trump 
administration. A need to enforce new greenhouse gas 
emission limitations will substantially increase the strain 
on EPA’s already undersized, overburdened career 
enforcement staff. It is imperative that future federal 
climate change legislation include significant increases 
in EPA’s budget so the agency can increase its 
enforcement staff to needed levels. 
Establish (and fund) an EPA program focused on 
recruiting and training the enhanced, skillful, and nimble 
professional staff that will be needed to enforce limits on greenhouse gas 
emissions. Environmental enforcement is a far more complex and 
sophisticated activity than may be evident at first blush. Therefore, to 
rebuild the agency, Congress must press EPA to recruit an outstanding new 
cohort of enforcement staffers and train them well for their critically 
important work. 
Substantive Enforcement Provisions 
Include strong and effective enforcement provisions. Enforcement 
provisions in existing environmental statutes vary in their effectiveness. 
Future climate change legislation should include enforcement sections 
modeled on the most robust regulatory enforcement mechanisms currently 
in effect. 
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Require EPA to resume meaningful oversight of state and environmental 
agency enforcement programs and provide grants to improve state 
enforcement programs. Under most federal environmental programs, 
states play a critical role in permitting and enforcement, and federal climate 
legislation will presumably continue this pattern. Regrettably, many states 
lack the resources, expertise, and/or political will to enforce environmental 
standards adequately. Federal funding and oversight are essential but have 
dramatically decreased during the last few years. Congress should 
significantly increase funding for State and Tribal Assistance Grants. In 
addition, Congress should direct EPA to resume a diligent, effective 
oversight role of state enforcement efforts. 
Expressly allow and encourage both EPA and the U.S. Department of 
Justice to use Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) in settling 
federal enforcement actions against entities that violate greenhouse gas 
emission limits. When agencies settle an enforcement case with a violator, 
they not only impose penalties, but often include Supplemental 
Environmental Projects that provide a tangible environmental or health 
benefit to the public and have a direct connection to the polluter's 
violations. Although the Trump administration’s Department of Justice 
actively discouraged their use, SEPs have a long and proven record of 
environmental success. In the climate context, they could be used to 
encourage non-complying emitters of greenhouse gases to plant trees, 
preserve lakes and wetlands, and set aside tracts of land to serve as 
greenhouse gas “sinks.”  
Include an effective citizen suit provision in any new climate change 
legislation. Citizen suits and/or citizen petitions are a feature of almost 
every major federal environmental statute. They are an important safeguard 
against lax federal and state enforcement and have been used successfully 
to force governmental compliance with rulemaking deadlines and to redress 
non-compliance by industrial and municipal pollution sources. A new 
federal climate change statute should expressly allow citizens to bring suit 
for past violations and allow an award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing or 
partially prevailing citizen plaintiffs. Congress should also avoid including 
diligent prosecution provisions that open the door to “sweetheart deals” 
between polluters and state and federal agencies that effectively forestall 
citizen suits.  
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Structural Considerations for Climate 
Governance 
By William W. Buzbee, Alejandro E. Camacho, Robert L. Glicksman, Alice 
Kaswan, Dave Owen, and Karen Sokol 
Summary 
Analysis of the success or failure of regulatory programs often focuses on 
their substantive merits or the procedures that govern their implementation. 
But the fate of a regulatory program may be driven as much by structural 
considerations as by its substantive or procedural aspects. Policymakers in 
the United States have long focused largely on one structural aspect of 
regulation – federalism. Congress’s allocations of authority between the 
federal and state governments – often referred to as the cooperative 
federalism features of environmental regulation – have worked reasonably 
well in some contexts. In others, however, legislators’ failure to attend to a 
wider range of structural dimensions has led to allocations of government 
authority that are less likely to achieve statutory objectives and promote 
effective, fair, and accountable government. 
Congress has the opportunity to avoid similar mistakes in crafting a new 
regulatory regime to address the core threats from the climate crisis. By 
recognizing and differentiating among three dimensions of regulatory 
authority, and by carefully tailoring allocations of 
authority to perform different government 
functions, Congress can adopt regulatory 
programs that reflect a careful balance of the 
policy values implicated in climate change 
governance. Congress should consider not 
only the tradeoffs of assigning authority to 
either states or the federal government, but 
also the tradeoffs of (1) varying the level of 
centralization by governmental function; (2) 
configurations that assign overlapping federal and state roles for 
particular government functions, as well as overlapping roles for various 
federal agencies; and (3) altering the amount and type of coordination 
between federal and state authorities (and among federal agencies).  
Based on the expanded array of structural choices that these dimensional 
and functional allocation choices present, we make the following 
recommendations for legislation to address climate change: 
Recommendation 1: Congress should consider the differential risks raised 
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• For adaptation, the combination of mostly localized harms and benefits 
suggests (1) a primarily decentralized infrastructure for most 
governmental functions, (2) limited overlapping authority (with federal 
primacy) of key functions, such as standard setting to exploit redundancy 
while minimizing inefficiencies, and (3) inter-jurisdictional coordination 
to help manage cross-jurisdictional effects. 
• For mitigation, the combination of global or local environmental benefits 
and localized harms apt to result point generally to (1) centralized 
standard setting, supplemented by state and local authority; (2) 
overlapping state and federal authority for functions for which safety net 
advantages are important; and (3) independent authority for functions 
such as standard setting and enforcement, but coordinated mechanisms 
for functions such as research funding and information dissemination to 
promote efficiency. 
• For geoengineering, the catastrophic global harms that may result from 
unilateral deployment by an actor spurred by local environmental or 
economic benefits generally suggests (1) centralized control of research 
and deployment, (2) overlapping authority to create a safety net to guard 
against imprudent deployment, and (3) international coordination to 
minimize deployment by solitary institutions. 
Recommendation 2: The experience in U.S. environmental law over the past 
fifty years suggests that: 
• Combining federal primacy over certain governmental functions (like 
financing, information dissemination, and standard setting) with state 
primacy over others (like planning, implementation, and enforcement) 
helps leverage the advantages of centralized and decentralized 
authority. 
• Overlapping authority is a good fit for functions that risk under-
regulation or regulatory capture, such as standard-setting or 
enforcement, while more distinct authority for functions such as 
information generation and information dissemination is useful in 
achieving economies of scale and avoiding wasteful duplication. 
• Congress should rely on different types of intergovernmental 
coordination when it seeks to pool regulator expertise, harmonize 
regulation, or reduce the risk of a regulatory race to the bottom, but also 
provide independent authority for functions such as standard setting to 
promote intergovernmental competition or avoid the risk of regulator 
groupthink. 
Recommendation 3: Congress should restore California’s authority to 
establish emissions controls on greenhouse gas emissions that are more 
stringent than those established by EPA, as well as other states’ authority to 
adopt California’s standards. It should do so by reversing the agency rule 
preempting California’s authority to set GHG standards and by reversing 
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EPA’s revocation in 2019 of California’s waiver authority or by lightening 
California’s burden of justifying future waivers, or both. Such action would 
avoid needlessly sacrificing the advantages of decentralized, overlapping, 
and independent regulatory authority and preserve a powerful weapon in 
the fight against climate change and deadly air pollution. 
Recommendation 4: Congress should establish a strong federal role in 
climate mitigation where appropriate, including establishing national 
greenhouse gas reduction goals, a national carbon pricing system, and 
mobile source emission control requirements. The federal government 
should also invest in research and development, as well as provide financial 
resources to state and local governments for planning and implementation 
of mitigation and adaptation measures. 
Recommendation 5: Congress should establish strong federal parameters 
shaping state and local action to ensure that state and local governments 
are meeting their respective responsibilities to contribute to nationwide 
decarbonization.  
Recommendation 6: Within these federal parameters, states should retain a 
significant role in planning and developing regulatory requirements in the 
areas of electricity, building standards, transportation, and adaptation 
actions. 
Recommendation 7: Legislation addressing the climate crisis should not 
immunize the fossil fuel industry from accountability in state tort law. 
Instead, it should explicitly preserve state common-law suits seeking redress 
for climate/COVID harms to ensure that state law continues to serve its 
traditional and vital role of protecting the environment and public health. 
Background 
Structural deficiencies may occur if policymakers fail to appreciate the full 
array of choices they have in allocating authority both between and within 
levels of government.117  
First, federalism issues relate to one dimension of decision-making authority 
– how centralized or decentralized the authority to regulate is. But, although 
deciding how to allocate authority along that dimension is important, as the 
federalism aspects of environmental regulation demonstrate, the 
centralization-decentralization dimension is only one of three dimensions 
along which authority may be allocated. Allocations of authority also can be 
arrayed on a spectrum from overlapping to distinct, and from highly 
coordinated to independent. 
Positioning authority at a particular point along each dimension allows 
policymakers to promote important policy values.  
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• Decentralized authority, for example, has the capacity to leverage local 
knowledge and expertise, tailor regulation to local conditions, and foster 
regulatory experimentation. Centralized authority, on the other hand, 
may take advantage of economies of scale, foster uniformity, and 
address collective action problems, like competitive fears or the “free-
rider” problem, more effectively.  
• Overlapping authority can reduce risks of under-regulation and agency 
capture, but distinct authority may minimize compliance or 
administrative costs, as well as limit risks of conflicting regulation or 
overregulation.  
• Coordinated authority has the capacity to reduce duplicative 
inefficiencies and inconsistencies and to promote accountability by 
combating drift, shirking, and free riding by regulators. Independent 
authority, in contrast, can avoid transaction costs of 
coordination, combat groupthink that can squelch 
innovation, and foster beneficial competition among 
multiple regulators.  
Because the poles of each dimension promote different 
and potentially conflicting values, policymakers have to 
prioritize the goals of their regulatory programs in order 
to make appropriate structural choices. A decentralized 
configuration that aims to promote experimentation, for 
instance, may require sacrificing transaction cost 
efficiency that a centralized regime is capable of 
achieving. Situating authority along one dimension, 
however, may help offset disadvantages that result from 
situating authority along a different one. For example, 
coordination can be a useful means of avoiding the risk of 
inaction by regulators with overlapping authority. To best 
promote statutory objectives, policymakers should consider holistically the 
interactions among all three dimensions. 
Second, policymakers often do not consider the benefits of differentiating 
regulatory authority based on the different government functions that 
regulation entails, such as funding, research, information distribution, 
information analysis, planning, standard setting, implementation, 
permitting, inspection and compliance monitoring, and enforcement. An 
allocation of authority that makes sense for the financing of a regulatory 
program, for example, may be ill-suited to functions such as permitting or 
enforcement. Differentiating allocations along one or more dimension 
according to function may the best way to accommodate the conflicting 
values that may result from policymakers’ dimensional choices. 
Policymakers routinely conflate these dimensions and fail to differentiate 
among governmental functions, resulting in mismatches between the 
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problems that allocations of authority were designed to address and the 
solutions chosen to address them. The recommendations provided here 
urge more careful consideration of the tradeoffs of allocating authority to 
address climate change at different points along each of the three 
dimensions. They also reflect the conclusion that allocations should differ 
based on the function being exercised, rather than choosing a single 
allocation for all functions within a single subject area. 
Proposed Policy: Allocating Authority for Three Different 
Aspects of Climate Change Regulation 
By Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman 
Background and Context 
Although allocation decisions inevitably will be context specific, climate 
change adaptation, mitigation, and geoengineering implicate disparate 
tradeoffs that generally suggest different structural configurations.  
Adaptation 
Strategies for managing the effects of climate tend to be deployed locally 
and often involve particularly acute local benefits and harms.  
• In light of the diversity of and uncertainty accompanying most localized 
climate effects, a primarily decentralized infrastructure would likely be 
appropriate for most governmental functions, with limited centralization 
of certain functions such as funding and information dissemination for 
which economies of scale, uniformity, and/or transboundary cost 
internalization are especially salient.  
• Limited overlapping authority (with federal primacy) of key functions 
such as standard setting may best exploit redundancy while minimizing 
inefficiencies.  
• Certain types of inter-jurisdictional coordination will help manage cross-
jurisdictional effects. 
Mitigation 
Strategies to limit greenhouse gas emissions provide environmental 
benefits that may be either global or local in scale, but the economic harms 
caused by such regulation tend to be localized. Accordingly: 
• The need for a national contribution to the global effort to curtail 
emissions, as well as the risk of state inaction due to collective action 
problems, suggests a robust role for centralized standard setting. Federal 
standard-setting should, however, be supplemented by state authority 
to promote experimentation and diversity.  
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• Overlapping state and federal authority for various functions is 
appropriate to accrue safety net advantages and reduce capture risks, 
especially absent a binding baseline international regime.  
• Relatively independent authority for functions such as standard setting, 
permitting, and enforcement could foster a “race to the top” among 
regulators and combat agency groupthink. 
• Coordination mechanisms for functions such as research funding and 
information dissemination could promote economies of scale and 
eliminate wasteful duplication of effort.  
• Coordinated implementation of cross-jurisdiction cap-and-trade regimes 
could generate cost-efficient emission reductions. 
Geoengineering  
It is possible that even a single actor might deploy large-scale strategies to 
alter the global climate, spurred by the promise of local environmental 
and/or economic benefits. That action could, however, pose global 
environmental risks.  
• Risks of unilateral deployment of untried, irreversible, and catastrophic 
technologies suggests: 
 Centralized control of research and deployment to minimize cross-
jurisdiction harms 
 Leveraging the redundancy benefits of overlapping authority, and  
 International coordination to minimize deployment by solitary 
institutions.  
• On the other hand, independent, decentralized governance of research 
and analysis of possible technologies may better promote diverse 
research on risks and opportunities. 
Recommendations 
In structuring governance over climate change mitigation, adaptation, and 
geoengineering activities: 
• Congress should consider the tradeoffs of assigning authority to either 
states or the federal government. 
• It should consider varying the level of centralization by governmental 
function. 
• It should explore configurations that assign overlapping federal and 
state roles for particular government functions, as well as overlapping 
roles for various federal agencies. 
• It should alter the amount and type of coordination between federal and 
state authorities (and among federal agencies). 
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Proposed Policy: A Better Approach to Factoring 
Federalism Considerations into Regulatory Strategies 
By Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman 
Controversies over the appropriate allocations of policymaking authority 
between the federal and state governments are almost as old as the 
Republic, as the Supreme Court pointed out in a 1992 decision involving the 
distribution of authority over radioactive waste disposal.118 Yet, the disputes 
never seem fully resolved. Certainly that is true of environmental regulation.  
The federal pollution control statutes exemplify the neglected potential for 
well-informed structural choices. Congress built the core environmental 
statutes on a foundation of cooperative federalism. It established the 
overarching policies, such as the Clean Air Act’s goals of improving and 
protecting the nation’s air quality to avoid public health risks. But Congress 
shared the responsibility of implementing those policies 
between the states and the federal government, acting 
primarily through the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA).  
The cooperative federalism model has worked 
reasonably well, resulting in enhanced public health and 
natural resource protection. It is a relatively rare instance 
of Congress intentionally varying the allocation of 
authority along one of the three dimensions – the extent of centralization of 
authority – by regulatory function or task. In some cases, Congress created 
centralized authority by charging one entity with the sole responsibility for 
carrying out a particular function or task, such as EPA’s exclusive authority to 
adopt national ambient air quality standards under the Clean Air Act. In 
other cases, the Act creates decentralized authority through shared 
regulatory authority between the two sovereigns, such as by preserving 
state authority to adopt more stringent emission control standards for 
stationary sources than EPA has enacted. Such cooperative federalism can 
help leverage advantages of centralized federal governance (such as 
expertise and superior ability to address cross-jurisdictional externalities), as 
well as those of state governance (such as local knowledge). 
However, as detailed below, neither policymakers nor scholars seem to 
appreciate that cooperative federalism also implicates key tradeoffs 
associated with the other two dimensions of authority.  
The Overlapping-Distinct Dimension 
As stated on page 2 above, situating authority at different points along the 
overlap-distinctness dimension for each regulatory function results in 
different tradeoffs of the values that regulation is designed to serve. The 
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failure to appreciate the consequences of alternative structural options 
often leads to missed opportunities to promote regulatory goals more 
effectively, efficiently, or equitably. The Trump administration, for instance, 
has heavily focused on reducing overlapping authority because of perceived 
administrative waste. To be sure, having two regulators do the same thing 
may raise administrative costs. But one should not reflexively assume that 
having two authorities involved in a program necessarily means duplication 
of tasks. Assigning one government control over one function and another 
government authority over a completely different one leads to little 
duplication of activity.  
Even in cases where more than one authority has the same role, observers 
routinely fail to account for the significant advantages of overlapping 
authority. This includes, for example, the safety net provided in case one 
level of government is unable or unwilling to act. Many observers simply 
ignore these advantages, but they have proven to be key to the success of 
cooperative federalism laws.  
The Coordinated-Independent Dimension 
Similarly, many policymakers have failed to appreciate that, designed 
properly, the extent and type of coordination between the federal and state 
governments can help mitigate any costs raised by overlap. Congress can 
combine limited state and federal overlap with clear coordination 
mechanisms between these governments. In so doing, it can achieve many 
of the safety net advantages of overlapping authority while minimizing the 
costs of duplication. 
As is true for the other dimensions, creating coordinated or independent 
authority presents a different mix of advantages and disadvantages. 
Legislators and other structuring regulatory programs should consider these 
tradeoffs in designing governance regimes, including establishing a 
different mix of coordination and independence for different regulatory 
functions. Finally, even if the tradeoffs favor coordination, policymakers 
should recognize that it is possible to vary the extent of coordination (as well 
as tradeoffs of doing so).  
Recommendations 
The experience in U.S. environmental law over the past 50 years suggests 
that in adopting climate legislation: 
• Congress should establish federal primacy over governmental functions 
(like financing, information dissemination, and standard setting) for 
which economies of scale, uniformity, or the need to abate 
interjurisdictional harms are important. At the same time, it should vest 
the states with primacy over other functions (like planning, 
implementation and enforcement) that would benefit from local 
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expertise, diversity of approach and experimentation, and greater public 
accessibility. This combination would help leverage the advantages of 
centralized and decentralized authority. 
• Overlapping authority is a good fit for functions that risk under-
regulation or regulatory capture, such as standard-setting or 
enforcement. This approach is reflected in the provisions in virtually all of 
the federal pollution control laws that preserve state authority to adopt 
regulatory standards (and impose common law remedies) that are more 
stringent than federal standards, and in the retention of federal authority 
to enforce state-imposed obligations under some of these laws. More 
distinct authority for functions, such as information generation and 
information dissemination, is useful in achieving economies of scale, 
avoiding wasteful duplication and lowering the risk of inaction and lack 
of accountability stemming from the regulatory commons that shared 
authority may create. 
• Congress should rely on different types of intergovernmental 
coordination (such as coordination that is more or less frequent, 
hierarchical, or formal) when it seeks to pool regulator expertise, avoid 
inefficient duplication of effort, harmonize regulation, or reduce the risk 
of a regulatory race to the bottom. Independent authority, however, may 
be a good choice for functions, such as information analysis, standard 
setting, and enforcement, to minimize administrative costs, promote 
intergovernmental competition, or avoid the risk of regulator 
groupthink. 
Proposed Policy: Overlapping Authority to Limit 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Motor Vehicles 
By Alejandro E. Camacho and Robert L. Glicksman 
Background and Context 
For five decades, California and the federal government have worked in 
tandem in an innovative exercise in federalism aimed at achieving cleaner 
air. California has played an important role in controlling greenhouse gas 
emissions (GHGs) that contribute to climate change, particularly from motor 
vehicles. But now, contrary to law and in a massive departure from 
longstanding practice, Donald Trump has pulled the rug out from under 
California’s feet by divesting it of its longstanding authority to adopt auto 
emission controls for greenhouse gases that are more stringent than the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency’s.119 That action, if not overturned in 
pending judicial challenges, will neuter California’s innovative leadership by 
disabling an important tool for combatting climate change. 
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Because of the severity of California’s pollution problems and the state’s 
early environmental leadership, the Clean Air Act specifically allows the state 
to apply for a waiver of the prohibition on state auto emission standards 
more stringent than the federal government’s. California has sought waivers 
more than a hundred times, and with one short-lived exception, EPA has 
granted every request – precisely as the law anticipated. 
Once EPA grants a waiver, any other state may follow 
California’s ambitious lead by adopting its standards. 
Essentially, then, the Clean Air Act provides all states 
with two options: the federal standard or the more 
stringent California option. 
The result is that more than a dozen states follow 
California’s more stringent standards, which is why 
many cars sold outside the state bear a sticker that says 
the car has met California’s standards. The auto industry 
has long since adjusted to these dual standards, not 
wanting to ignore such a huge market for its products. 
But the Trump administration deviated sharply from 
established bipartisan practice by revoking previously approved waivers for 
California, purportedly to achieve nationally uniform emission controls and 
eliminate “duplicative” regulation. The second part of its devastating one-
two punch was to weaken federal standards adopted during the Obama 
administration that had required fuel efficiency improvements that would 
reduce GHG auto emissions.120 
To be sure, centralization may promote uniformity, and reducing 
overlapping authority may modestly decrease some administrative costs. 
However, in addition to being of questionable legality,121 EPA’s revocation 
completely ignored the most important advantages of the prior system, as 
well as the significant downsides of revoking the waiver. These include:  
• The allocation of standard-setting authority to California embodies a 
productive balancing of the different dimensions of regulatory authority: 
from centralized to decentralized, overlapping to distinct, and 
coordinated to independent.  
• The Clean Air Act’s bifurcated standard-setting authority for auto 
emissions fosters the experimentation advantages of decentralization. 
But by allowing only two sets of standards – EPA’s and California’s – it 
also tempers the risk of many conflicting standards and overregulation.  
• Similarly, by requiring that EPA approve California’s waiver requests, the 
law requires some coordination, fostering pooling of expertise and 
resources. But it also cultivates innovation by ensuring each regulator’s 
independence. That allocation has allowed California to engage in 
innovative regulation. In fact, several large automakers recently agreed 
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to conform to the state’s ambitious GHG controls, notwithstanding EPA’s 
effort to eliminate them.122  
• Finally, the waiver repeal ignores how the law’s modest overlap in 
authority creates a safety net and guards against undue industry control 
of regulatory agencies that is all too apparent under the Trump 
administration. Weighing these different tradeoffs is key to designing 
effective governance, but EPA completely misses all of them. 
California’s innovation and leadership should be fostered, not squelched. 
Retaining the state’s authority to adopt more stringent GHG auto emission 
standards is a critical vehicle for doing so. Congress should reverse 
revocation of the existing GHG waiver, and along the way, lighten the state’s 
burden of proving eligibility for future waivers, or even eliminate EPA’s veto 
authority altogether.  
Either approach would foster regulatory experimentation and provide a 
check on inaction or inadequate regulation by EPA. Moreover, these 
changes would not forfeit the significant benefits typically associated with 
coordinated regulatory authority (such as EPA’s authority to review state 
standards). Though coordination can reduce the risk that states will adopt 
ever-weaker standards to attract business or otherwise fail to protect public 
health, neither is a concern here. California has consistently adopted more 
stringent controls than EPA. 
Recommendation 
• EPA’s revocation promises to wreak havoc with the Clean Air Act’s careful 
balancing of the tradeoffs associated with alternative regulatory 
allocations. Congress should restore California’s emission control 
authority – by reversing EPA’s revocation of California’s waiver authority, 
lightening California’s burden of justifying future waivers, or both. Doing 
so would avoid needlessly sacrificing the advantages of decentralized, 
overlapping, and independent regulatory authority, and preserve a 
powerful weapon in the fight against climate change and deadly air 
pollution. 
Proposed Policy: States' Role in Federal Climate Legislation 
By Alice Kaswan, William W. Buzbee, and Dave Owen 
Background and Context 
Decisive federal climate action is essential. At the same time, however, 
federal climate legislation would not be built from a blank slate. Many states 
already have greenhouse gas reduction targets, action plans to meet those 
targets, related clean air programs, and substantial roles in the electricity 
sector. Congress should embrace an effective, strong federal role while 
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affirmatively creating an integrated federal/state partnership, as well as 
preserving and protecting additional state and local efforts, thereby gaining 
the benefits of both centralized and decentralized authority. 
The Value of Creating Affirmative State Roles within a Federal Structure 
A strong state role within federal law is not unusual. Many federal 
environmental laws embody a “cooperative federalism” approach that 
carefully structures federal, state, and local roles to create a cohesive whole 
that draws on the strengths of each jurisdictional level. This approach 
creates several key advantages. 
First, federal-state collaborations can lead to better-informed climate change 
responses. States could build on existing state climate action plans and learn 
from each other’s efforts. A strong state role in these areas is justified by the 
states’ expertise in their diverse geographic, economic, and social history 
and needs, and their historic diversity of efforts. And states may identify 
areas of effective regulation overlooked by federal 
legislation and regulation.  
Second, states can tailor their federal law implementation 
efforts to their unique circumstances and goals. For 
example, allowing state planning will enable states to 
develop integrated plans that achieve state-specific 
objectives, like enhancing public health by integrating 
GHG and co-pollutant emission reduction strategies, 
creating economic opportunities, and facilitating just 
transitions for communities and workers impacted by the 
demise of fossil fuels and other shifts in the nation’s 
economy.  
Third, federal-state collaborations can make climate responses more 
politically feasible and durable. States are more likely to support federal 
legislation if it includes some degree of state control. Preserving state and 
local roles will also enable greater bottom-up participation in conceiving our 
clean energy transition. 
The Importance of Preserving Existing State Authority 
Most federal environmental laws preserve existing state authority through 
“savings” clauses that allow states to choose to do more than required by 
federal regulation. As the federal government assumes a more prominent 
legal role in addressing climate change, Congress should, similarly, preserve 
state authority. Outright preemption of state roles should be the exception, 
not the norm. Federal environmental laws have almost uniformly included 
savings clauses, which allow overlapping state authority, because of the risk 
of federal regulatory ineffectiveness and backpedaling. Preserving state 
authority to do more has been crucial to maintaining national progress in 
meeting climate and other regulatory goals, and to test and establish 
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effective additional strategies. If federal climate regulatory zeal, once 
established, were to wane, or should federal measures turn out to be too lax 
to achieve needed climate progress, savings clauses preserving state 
authority would allow states to make up for the federal lapse.  
Recommendations 
• Establish a strong federal role where appropriate, including establishing 
national greenhouse gas reduction goals, establishing a national carbon 
pricing system and facilitating linkages among state, federal, and 
international markets, developing mobile source emission requirements, 
and investing in research and development. 
• Provide strong federal parameters to shape state and local action to 
ensure that state and local governments are meeting their respective 
responsibilities to contribute to nationwide decarbonization goals.  
• Establish and fund federal programs to facilitate state and regional 
climate action. Through ongoing collaboration between the federal 
government’s national and regional offices, and state (and sometimes 
local) regulators, the federal government should: 
 Continue research on climate change impacts and disseminate it to 
state and local governments;  
 Create clearinghouses for information about effective state, federal, 
and global strategies and practices to mitigate and adapt to climate 
change and provide technical support to help states and local 
governments implement them;  
 Create incentives for state and local cooperative climate regulation 
efforts; and  
 Provide financial resources to state and local governments for 
planning and implementation of mitigation and adaptation 
measures. 
• Within these federal parameters, allow states to play a significant and 
sometimes leadership role in planning and developing requirements in 
the following contexts:  
 Electricity: States have historically controlled electricity generation 
sources, land use decisionmaking and siting choices, and the majority 
of states have established renewable portfolio standards and energy 
efficiency standards. Potentially under an overarching federal 
Renewable Energy Standard, states, alone or in combination with 
states sharing the same electricity grid, could determine the mix of 
sources and efficiency measures most suitable for the state or region. 
In addition to determining sources, states could address the relative 
centralization or decentralization of sources and control, as well as 
realigning state utility regulatory policies to reflect the changing 
nature of the electricity sector. Careful coordination with authority 
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exercised by the federal Department of Energy and the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission will be necessary. 
 Buildings: Although the federal government should require all states 
to adopt building efficiency codes, states could tailor their approach 
to local weather conditions and their mix of new versus existing 
housing, and accommodate other local and regional concerns, 
including social welfare and historic preservation goals. 
 Transportation: Because land use patterns affect transportation 
emissions, state and local governments should be tasked with 
developing planning and zoning parameters and, as appropriate, 
developing transit systems or other measures and incentives to 
reduce vehicle miles travelled. As discussed more fully in the section 
on California’s automobile standards, federal climate law should 
reinstate California’s ability to establish a second option for GHG 
emission standards. 
 Adaptation: Given the highly localized nature of some climate 
impacts, states are well positioned to develop tailored adaptation 
plans, with federal planning and implementation support. In 
addition, any state and local use of federal spending on projects 
involving infrastructure and building should be required to include 
climate adaption assessment and prudent adjustment of plans. 
• Through savings clauses, federal climate legislation should explicitly 
preserve state and local government authority so they can impose 
additional state and local pollution reduction measures and pursue 
additional clean energy goals, whether to reduce GHG emissions; to 
meet other state and local environmental, safety, welfare, and health 
goals; or to achieve these goals through multi-pollutant reduction 
strategies. 
• Federal climate legislation should set regulatory floors that do not let 
states set standards lower than federal requirements, but should, in most 
instances, not preempt complementary state and local climate, clean 
energy, pollution control, and land use authority. Where legislation does 
include a preemption provision (like the partial preemption of mobile 
source standards), the preemption provision should make clear that 
preemption will be found only upon a fact-based, adjudicated 
determination of an actual, substantial conflict between such state and 
local efforts and federal requirements. Any federal preemption 
provisions should explicitly state that state and local government 
choices that merely seek additional reductions in emissions or embrace 
cleaner energy requirements or goals than federally required are not 
preempted unless such measures are proven to be directly in conflict 
and compliance with both is impossible. 
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Conclusion 
Federal leadership, control, and resources are warranted to address the 
emerging climate crisis. Nonetheless, federal climate legislation should craft 
a careful partnership with state and local entities. Such a federalism balance 
would set necessary goals and encourage cooperative state and local efforts 
while also preserving space for additional state and local regulatory efforts. 
Through such a climate federalism balance, the nation is likely to achieve a 
more effective transition that meshes with a diversity of state concerns and 
needs, increasing the benefits and decreasing the costs of a clean energy 
transition. 
Proposed Policy: The Role of State Tort Law in Climate 
Protections 
By Karen Sokol 
Background and Context 
Since the summer of 2017, numerous states, cities, counties, and one fishing 
industry association have filed tort suits in state courts against ExxonMobil, 
Chevron, BP, Shell, and other major fossil fuel companies, in an effort to hold 
them accountable for contributing to the climate crisis and then misleading 
the public about it.123 The plaintiffs seek compensation for myriad region-
specific climate harms – including current and future damages to 
infrastructure, land and other natural resources, and the public’s health, 
property, and livelihoods – caused by sea-level rise, drought, wildfires, ocean 
acidification, storms of record-breaking severity, and other climate-driven 
environmental disruptions. The most recent case as of this writing, filed by 
Minnesota Attorney General Keith Ellison in June 2020, highlights the 
disproportionate impacts of the climate crisis on Black, Indigenous, and 
brown communities.124 
In their public relations messaging, the industry and its trade associations 
condemn the suits and call for legislation providing them with immunity. 
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has called for such legislation at the state 
level,125 and the National Association of Manufacturers created an advocacy 
arm with the sole mission of attacking the state suits that will likely do so as 
well.126 Given that several suits are poised to begin discovery proceedings in 
state courts, a process that could lead to further revelations of corporate 
deception and other malfeasance, the industry can be expected to push for 
immunity at the federal level as well. Indeed, the industry has already 
pushed for sweeping immunity in the COVID-19 relief packages that 
Congress has been considering.127 In light of this, the industry will almost 
certainly call for such immunity in any federal climate legislation. Federal 
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and state legislators should resist such efforts as they craft vital climate 
legislation.  
It is beyond question that, like COVID-19 relief legislation, climate legislation 
is urgently needed. But, as summarized below, by its very nature, legislation 
– no matter how robust its protections and how well-crafted its provisions – 
will never obviate the need for state tort law to serve the unique, 
complementary role in forging corporate accountability and environmental 
and public health protections that it has long served in the U.S. legal system.  
State tort law has always been an important legal mechanism in this country 
for holding private actors responsible for unreasonable misconduct and for 
providing compensation to those harmed by that misconduct. It became 
particularly important in the mid-20th century, as corporate actors amassed 
greater economic and political power while also gaining significant control 
over public perceptions as a result of their sophisticated – and often 
deceptive – marketing campaigns. In the 1960s, in response to widespread 
harms caused by businesses’ reliance on misleading marketing strategies to 
unsafe products, state courts began drawing on existing state tort law 
principles to provide relief to the injured, as well as accountability to the 
public at large. That function was and remains all the more important 
because corporate influence had by then begun to wield significant 
influence over the regulatory system, leaving public protections inadequate 
in important ways. Thus, state courts served as a legal venue for those 
seeking redress for harms caused by the wrongdoing of various industries, 
including the tobacco, gun, chemical, food production, and fossil fuel 
industries. In addition to providing much-needed compensation to the 
injured, these tort suits have induced industries to operate more safely, 
avoiding future harms.  
The current wave of climate suits that states, cities, and counties all over the 
country have filed against fossil fuel industry defendants may prove to be 
the most important mass tort suits yet. Even before discovery, the plaintiffs 
have extensive documentation that the defendants have (1) known for 
decades that they were contributing to the climate crisis and its devastating 
consequences, and (2) responded to that knowledge with a concerted 
disinformation campaign about the climate crisis and its connection to 
fossil-fuel product use and an acceleration of their business to further 
entrench societal dependence on fossil fuels. This is the sort of corporate 
malfeasance that state tort law has been addressing for decades.  
Such state venues are particularly essential now, when the Trump 
administration is systematically suppressing climate science and its 
implications across agencies, including the EPA, the Department of the 
Interior, the Department of Agriculture, and the State Department. The 
administration’s systematic suppression of climate science is part of the way 
it supports its efforts to dismantle the climate protections that were in place 
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and to justify its refusal to provide the much more extensive protections that 
are necessary128 while accelerating approval and construction of pipelines 
and increasing drilling on federal lands and offshore.129 
Ensuring that these state claims are preserved in federal climate legislation 
will greatly strengthen the national response to the climate crisis and 
complement legislative action to reduce emissions and adapt to the climate 
crisis. More specifically, the ability to bring a state tort action will remain 
essential even after climate legislation is adopted for at least three reasons:  
• Federal regulation of greenhouse gases is unlikely to compensate 
current and future victims of the climate crisis, and state tort law can 
provide some measure of relief; 
• The civil discovery process can provide essential information on both the 
climate crisis and the fossil fuel industry’s longstanding attempts to hold 
onto their profits in ways that intensified climate disruption; and  
• In the event that federal targets end up weak or if, as is currently the 
case, implementation ceases or falters, state tort law can provide a vital 
safety net.  
Recommendations 
• Legislation addressing the climate or any other crisis should not include 
provisions immunizing the fossil fuel industry from accountability in 
state tort law.  
• As climate harms multiply, legislation should instead explicitly preserve 
state common-law suits seeking redress for climate or COVID harms to 
ensure that state law is allowed to continue to serve its traditional and 
vital role protecting the environment and public health. Instead, such 
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